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UNITED STATES V. OAKLEY: JUST TO MAKE
THE PRACTICE OF MILITARY LAW ALITTLE BIT HARDER
By
THEODORE A. BORRILLO*
HAROLD E. ROGERS, JR.**
INTRODUCTION

Advocacy is a skill and an art; easy to criticize, difficult to fairly appraise. Indeed, a post-mortem of criminal
trials, selected at random, would undoubtedly reveal flaws
of varying magnitude in the trial techniques of respected
members of the bar. Our profession is one in which hindsight is a meager measure of counsel's competency. Trial
strategy is seldom viewed with a uniform eye.'
An accused's right in military law to the effective assistance of
counsel 2 took a curious and questionable turn in the U.S. Army
Board of Review decision of United States v. Oakley.3 The decision
posed the following rather important questions, worthy of consideration and evaluation: (1) how serious must be the trial errors of
defense counsel to enable an accused to procure a new trial because
of inadequate' representation; and (2) to what extent should trial
defense counsel be permitted to exercise his own judgment about
trial tactics?
I. A CONFINING APPROACH To REPRESENTATIO1
In the Oakley case the accused asserted on appeal that he had
been inadequately represented at trial. 4 The accused, Chief Warrant Officer Andrew W. Oakley, was convicted of stealing $688.00
in military payment certificates in violation of Article 121, Uniform
Code of Military Justice. On the date of the offense the accused
had been designated as finance officer to pay certain Army personnel and proceeded to the post finance officer to pick up his bag
of money. He signed a receipt for the 'amount of money contained
in the bag. Upon completion of his duty as pay officer he returned
the bag of money left over from unpaid personnel to the post finance officer, but was unable to account for the sum of $688.00. He
later confessed to criminal investigation agents that he had incurred
a number of debts, that he had written checks which had been returned by the bank for lack of sufficient funds, and that he had
taken the $688.00 from the payroll to cover these debts.
.Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
**Member of California Bar and San Francisco low firm of Cushing, Cullinan, Hancock & Rothert.
1 United States v. Stoecker, 216 F.2d 51,'52(7th Cir. 1954).
2 The rights accorded to an accused by the Uniform Code of Military Justice closely parallel those
rights accorded to defendants in civilian courts. For example, the defendant has the right to be
informed of the charges against him, to be confronted by witnesses testifying against him, not to be
compelled to incriminate himself, and the right to be repiesented by counsel. Right to counsel in
military law is a two-fold right which
includes the right to appointed counsel throughout the proceed2
ing, Arts. 27, 32b, 38b, c and e, 4 a, 46 and 70, UCMJ: MCM, 1951, paras. 6, pp. 9-12, 46a and b,
p. 67-68, 61f(), pp. 86-87, and 102a, pp. 172-73, and the right to his effective assistance, United
tates v. Gardner, 9 USCMA 48, 25 CMR 310 (1958). The right to effective assistence of counsel is not
satisfied by a mere formal appointment of counsel, and where counsel's conduct at triclis considered
inadequate, reversal of the conviction is warranted. United States v. Gardner, supra.
3 CM 398074, Oakley, 25 CMR 624 (1958). In researching a point of military law, the authors
"accidentally" came across the disturbing Oakley precedent. Since the case had escaped comment in
legal periodicals (as do so many interesting military law decisions), and because of its dangerous
implications, the authors felt it warranted comment, even at this late date.
4 Id. at 625.
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During the course of the pretrial interview the accused stated
to his counsel, among other things, that the confession was the product of duress, but was never able to convince him that it was inadmissable. Trial defense counsel questioned the criminal investigators who took the statement and became convinced that there
was no merit to the accused's contention of duress or to a later claim
that he had requested counsel during the CID 5 investigation. Counsel was aware that the prosecution would bring in two experienced
CID investigators who took the statement and a military police
captain who heard virtually the entire interrogation to refute any
claim by the accused that he had been placed under duress or had
asked for or had been denied counsel. Counsel therefore concluded
that there was little prospect of excluding the statement and that
at best an unsuccessful effort along that line would be only a waste
of time.
Counsel was also aware that the evidence of accused's guilt
apart from his confession was quite convincing. Two witnesses
from the military finance office where the accused received his bag
of money testified that the amount placed in the bag had been
checked and double checked, that the accused had signed and acknowledged receipt for sums including the amount he was short,
and that the chance for there to be an error in the amount of money
placed in the bag was extremely remote.6
With the assent of the accused, counsel arranged to have Mr.
Oakley examined by an Army psychiatrist of considerable experience in the field of criminal insanity. On the basis of Mr. Oakley's
statements to him the psychiatrist concluded that the accused took
the money because of an irresistable impulse 7 and would have done
so if the risk of detection were extremely high.8 However, other
Army psychiatrists came to the opposite point of view.9
In light of the otherwise overwhelming evidence of the accused's guilt, counsel determined that the most promising strategy
would be to defend on the ground of temporary insanity. The accused assented to this strategy. Counsel further determined that it
would be bad strategy to challenge the voluntariness of the confession. Not only would a strong rebuttal by three prosecution witnesses be brought to bear against a claim of involuntariness, but in
addition evidence of the larceny independent of the confession was
quite strong. The most important reason for not challenging the
confession was that it would without doubt jeopardize the defense
of irresistable impulse. First of all, the court most likely would
5 Criminal Investigation Department.
6 Record, 3 October 1957, pp. 8-25, CM 398074, Oakley, supra note 3.
7 In military low "a person is not mentally responsible in a criminal sense for an offense unless
he was, at the time, so far free from mental defect, disease, or derangement as to be able concerning
the particular act charged both to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere to the right." Para.
120b, MCM, 1951, 200. (Emphasis added.)
8 To establish irresistable impulse it must appear that "the compulsion generated by the illness
was so strong that the act would have been committed even though the circumstances were such that
the accused could expect to be detected and apprehended forthwith when the offense was committed."
U.S. Dep'ts of the Army and Air Force, Psychiatry in Military Law, TM 8-240, AFM 160-42, p. 5 (1953).
If the medical officer is satisfied that the accused would not have committed the act had the circumstances been such that immediate detection and apprehension was certain, he will not testify that the
act occurred as the result of an 'irresistable impulse.' No impulse that can be resisted in the presence
of a high risk of detection or apprehension is really very 'irresistable'." Id. at 6. For an interesting
and well written opinion concerning the defense of irresistable impulse, see United States v. Smith,
5 USCM9 314, 17 CMR 314 (1954).
9 Although three psychiatrists had concluded that the accused was, at the time of the alleged
offense, capable of adhering to the right, only one of these psychiatrists testified at trial.
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question the sincerity of accused's claims regarding his sanity if he
attempted to hide an admission of his guilt, and might doubt the
truthfulness of his claims if his testimony concerning the voluntariness of the confession were soundly refuted by three strong prosecution witnesses. Moreover, a frank and open admission that the
larceny had in fact been committed was more consistent with the
theory that the accused would have committed the larceny realizing
that the risk of detection was extremely high, than would be an attempt to obscure or deny the fact that he had committed the larceny.
The court found the accused guilty and therefore sane at the
time of the offense. However, it is probable that the defense psychiatrist did cast some doubt on the sanity of the accused, in that
the sentence of confinement awarded was six months when it could
have been five years.' 0
On appeal Mr. Oakley urged, among other things, that he had
been denied adequate representation in that counsel had failed to
challenge the voluntariness of the confession after his suggestion
to do so. The Board of Review agreed with Mr. Oakley, asserting
that " . . . counsel is under a duty, if his client requests, to raise the
issue of the voluntariness of defendant's confession, despite counsel's own considered professional opinion that such action will produce no substantially beneficial result.""
II. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
The harmful effects which the Oakley decision might produce
are several. If the rule of the case were followed it would have a
tendency to stifle the initiative and responsibility of trial defense
counsel. It would seem that counsel is important to an accused not
simply because of his knowledge of the law, but because of his
ability to weigh various theories of defense and to select the best.
The United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama12 spelled
out the importance of having counsel in a criminal trial. The accused is usually unfamiliar with the rules of evidence, he lacks the
skill and knowledge to prepare his defense and requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceeding. In fact, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to estab13
lish his innocence.
2

10 Para. 1 7c, MCM, 1951, 223.
11 Supra note 3 at 625. (Emphasis added.)
12 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
38 Ibid.
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It is submitted that legally trained counsel is provided for the
accused at a general court-martial not because of his familiarity
with the law alone, but because of the quality of his judgment
about how best to establish the innocence of his client. Cases are
not won on defense by indiscriminate presentation of every conceivable claim or defense. 14 Yet does the Oakley court mean to imply that all of these claims must be presented to the court even
though counsel knows from experience with the court and similar
cases that the accused's position probably would be jeopardized if
the claims were presented rather than withheld?
It is the task of trial defense counsel to use his training and his
experience to select from among the myriad of defense claims those
best calculated to further the interests of his client-either to establish his innocence or to reduce the punishment. If the accused
were competent to make all the judgments of trial strategy he
would not need counsel. And if the task of counsel is to further the
best interests of his client, then it would seem that he should not
be placed in a straight jacket by a rule of law which makes it error
for him to exercise his judgment. He must be given the responsibility for the presentation of his client's case and the attendant
freedom to mould together the facts and theories of defense which
will be most beneficial to the accused.
It is most probable that had trial defense counsel followed the
accused's suggestion to challenge the confession, he would have
done his client a disservice. In effect he would have been asking
the court to give equal credence to inconsistent claims. Can it therefore be sensibly urged that counsel inadequately represented Mr.
Oakley when he failed to challenge the confession-an issue on
which the testimony of his client would have become suspect and
serious doubts created as to the sincerity of a plea of insanity?
III.

THE PROBLEM OF UNWARRANTED APPEALS

The Oakley decision again raises the problem of excessive and
frivilous appeals that the United States Court of Military Appeals
and the federal courts have tried to avoid. The tendency of a convicted person to hunt for a scapegoat has often resulted in his pointing a denunciatory finger at his counsel, and to speculate that pursuance of a different course might have altered the results of his
trial. Now, every time an accused has made a request upon his
counsel, or perhaps simply a suggestion to follow a certain line
of strategy and counsel failed to comply, his hopes for a new trial
will be sharply increased. It takes little imagination to envision
how the number of reversible cases under such circumstances
would multiply. And no measure exists to determine how many
trial defense counsel will act contrary to their better judgment by
following unwise suggestions by their clients for fear of reversal
and censure by an appellate court. And might some counsel be
tempted to use the Oakley ruling as a "tactic," in an effort to reserve for his client a possible basis for a retrial in the event of conviction?
14 Every counsel is familiar with the type of accused who has an excuse for everything, who
suggests some or innumerable ways to "beat the rap."
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IV. A

MISAPPLIED RULE OF CIVIL LAW

A disturbing aspect of the Oakley decision is that the Board,
as a basis for its conclusion that Mr. Oakley deserved a new trial,
relied principally upon an old rule of civil law which states that
... an attorney has the duty to present to the court all claims of
his client, unless he knows them to be false."' , A close examination
of these cases shows that the rule was not applied to criminal cases
in determining whether the defendant was entitled to a rehearing,
but rather was a rule of civil law permitting the defendant to sue
for civil damages. 16
V.

THE "EMPTY GESTURE" TEST

In addition to being a rule foreign to criminal law, the Board
of Review decision is questionable in that it departs from the traditional test applied to inadequate representation cases by federal
criminal courts and the United States Court of Military Appeals.
In the case of United States v. Hunter17 the USCMA adopted the
rather strict federal rule of Diggs v. Welch', in judging claims of
inadequate representation. Courts haye repeatedly held that military due process does not guarantee "perfect" counsel.19 Indeed,
there are few trials free from mistakes of counsel. . 1' Before a new
trial will be granted the accused must show that ".

.

. the proceed-

ings by which he was convicted were so erroneous as to constitute
a ridiculous and empty gesture, or were so tainted with negligence
or wrongful motives on the part of his counsel as to manifest a complete absence of judicial character."'
In the Hunter opinion the
court called for a strict adherence to this standard lest every unsuccessful representation be urged as a basis for reversal.2 2 Since
a convict is not subject to prosecution for perjury, a liberal interpretation of this rule might encourage a flood of petitions from
15 Supra note 3 at 625.
16 The annotations in 56 A.L.R. 953 (1928) and 45 A.L.R.2d 17 (1956) discuss a number of old state
civil cases (Mass. 1811, Pa. 1841, Ind. 1859, Tex. 1889, Cal. 1918, Ark. 1933, and Minn. 1942) wherein
clients were permitted to recover damages from former attorneys where the attorney had been negligent
in the prosecution of the case. A typical case was where the client had given instructions to his attorney to sue on a note by a certain date and the attorney failed to follow instructions and let the
statute of limitations run. The only criminal case which the Board of Review cites, Jackson v. United
States, 221 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1955), states that a stipulation of fact made by counsel out of his
client's hearing and without his consent is not binding an his client. This holding does not seem
particularly relevant to the question of whether counsel must challenge a confession if requested to do
so. And in that regard, the military rule is that an accused is bound by stipulations made in open
court by his counsel during the course of trial if he does not object. United States v. Swigert, 8 USCMA
468, 24 CMR 278 (1957). Also, in the Boese case, ACM S-3923, 6 CMR 608, 609 n. 1 (1952), the court
states that "...
it may be assumed that defense counsel has performed his duties properly, has
advised the accused of his rights and the law affecting his case, and that for reasons best known to
them, they desire to pursue a certain course (para. 53h, MCM 1951). Accused is charged with knowledqe
of the legal implications of defense counsel's conduct of the defense, even though the same may, in
retrospect, seem ill-advised ...
"
17 2 USCMA 37, 6 CMR 37 (1952).
18 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1945). In setting out the test, the court stated that the petitioner
must show a violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial under the due process clause; and
counsel's mistakes at trial will be only one of the factors which the court will consider in determining
whether the trial amounted to "a farce and a mockery of justice."
19 E.g., United States v. Bigger, 2 USCMA 297, 8 CMR 97 (1953). In United States v. Hunter, supra
note 17 at 41, 6 CMR at 41, the USCMA stated, "Undoubtedly, it would be desirable to furnish every
accused with a mature and experienced trial lawyer but that is presently an impossibility. The best
that can be done is to assure appointment of officers who are reasonably well qualified to protect
their substantial rights." (Emphasis added.)
20 See generally note 25 infra.
21 United States v. Hunter, supra note 17 at 41, 6 CMR at 41.
"22Ibid.

SIECS-LEWLOK. CORPORATIOn SEALS ALPINE 5-3422

DICTA

210

JULY-AuGuST, 1961

disappointed prisoners which appellate courts would be required

to hear. 23 In cases where the United States Supreme Court has
granted a writ of habeas corpus for inadequate representation, the
circumstances surrounding the trial have shocked the conscience of
the court and made the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice.2 4 Though the USCMA has become divided over the application of the Hunter rule in certain recent cases, it has uniformly applied that test to claims of inadequate representation.2 5 And although some other recent decisions suggest a slight modification of
the Hunter rule,26 not one has stepped as dangerously far afield as
the Oakley case.

VI.

THE IMPONDERABLES OF TRIAL TACTICS

The considerations that form the basis for a tactical decision
"are of such subtle nature that their application is as varied as
grains of sand on the ocean floor. ' 27 The court went on to say, "It
is this elusive quality which distinguishes the office lawyer from
the advocate. It would be capricious and foolhardy for any appellate body to proceed to the trial forum in retrospect there, and
with precisely drawn lines, distinguish between the varying shades
23 Diggs v. Welch, supra note 18 at 669-70. There the court stated, "It is well known that the
drafting of petitions for habeas corpus has become a game in many penal institutions. Convicts are
not subect to the deterrents of prosecution for perjury . . . The opportunity to try his former lawyer
has its undoubted attractions to a disappointed prisoner. [Writing down his allegations, even though
he knows they will not be believed, gives the prospect of a hearing and relief from monotony.] To
allow a prisoner to try the issue of the effectiveness of his counsel under a liberal definition of that
phrase is to give every convict the privilege of opening a Pandora's box of accusations which trial
courts near large penal institutions would be compelled to hear."
24 Id. at 670; Powell v. Alabama, supra note 12; United States v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
25 In United States v. Bigger, supra note 19, the USCMA rejected accused's claim of inadequate
representation. However, a new trial was granted in United States v. Walker, 3 USCMA 355, 12 CMR
111 (1953) where appointed counsel conceded accused's guilt in a murder case after individual counsel
had presented a forceful defense based on the theory of accident. There the court felt that appointed
counsel had been so grossly negligent as to come within the "exceptional situation recognized in the
Hunter case." In rejecting a claim of inadequacy in United States v. Soukup, 2 USCMA 141, 7 CMR 17
(1953), the USCMA stated that there had been no showing that counsel was obviously incompetent and
that the accused's argument simply invited an appellate trial of the professional judgment of his
counsel.
The USCMA agreed with the accused that his counsel was inadequate in United States v. Parker,
6 USCMA 75, 19 CMR 201 (1955). The accused had been sentenced to death and the court enumerated
a great variety of deficiencies on the part of counsel which convinced it that the proceedings manifested a "complete absence of judicial character." United States v. McMahon, 6 USCMA 709, 21 CMR
31 (1956) was another death sentence case which the court decided in the same manner as the Parker
case, supra. The court analyzed inadequacy in terms of due process and noted that any such appeal
would be rejected where it showed nothing more than that on hindsight there is a difference of
opinion regarding choice of tactics.
In three recent cases, United States v. Allen, 8 USCMA 604, 25 CMR 8 (1957), United States v.
Armell, 8 USCMA 513, 25 CMR 17 (1957), and United States v. Elkins, 8 USCMA 611, 25 CMR 115
(1958), the court with Judge Latimer dissenting sent the cases back to the Board of Review for factfinding determinations on the issue of inadequacy where counsel presented no evidence of mitigation
and made no argument following pleas of guilty. In the Elkins case, counsel contended that the
accused desired no mitigation to be presented, and Judge Latimer noted that it would indeed be a
bad rule of law where a "lawyer may be damned if he argues against the will of an accused or
damned if he doesn't." In that regard, the USCMA decided in United States v. Gardner, supra note 1,
that counsel was inadequate where he permitted the accused to take the stand and present evidence
which filled the gaps in the prosecution's case. The court rejected three recent appeals of the Allen type
where no mitigation was presented following a plea of guilty. United States v. Friborg, 8 USCMA 515,
25 CMR 19 (1957); United States v. Williams, 8 USCMA 552, 25 CMR 56 (1957); United States v.
Sarlouis, 9 USCMA 148, 25 CMR 410 (1958). There the court reasoned that to present mitigation would
bring forth harmful rebuttal and that counsel is not required to choose a course which may result in
prejudice to his client.
26 In United States v. Bigger, supra note 19 at 302, 8 CMR at 102, while the court applied the
Hunter rule, it indicated that perhaps an accused had to make an even stronger showing of inadequate
representation by its remark, '... The most we can command is that [defense counsel] . . .well
and truly, and within their capabilities represent the accused." Nevertheless, decisions for some time
thereafter applied the "empty gesture" test. See generally note 25 supra. However, in United States v.
Horne, 9 USCMA 601, 26 CMR 381, 384 (1958), the USCMA noted, "By that broad language [Hunter
rule] we did not intend to be understood as saying that the highest degree of professional competency
is not to be expected of an appointed counsel." And in a similar vein, in United States v. Kraskouskas,
9 USCMA 607, 610, 26 CMR 387, 390, a decision handed down the same day as the Home ruling, the
USCMA said, "The constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel . . . demands a professional
and requisite standard of skill. A fair standard of professional competence must be a necessary condition precedent with the professional undertaking of the defense of a person on trial for a crime."
27 CM 360555, Costillo-Acevedo, 12 CMR 318, 324 (1952).
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of the advocate's art. ' 28 Any quick condemnation of counsel should
therefore be avoided. 29 For while it is an easy task to second guess
a lawyer, consideration must be given to the fact that he is in possession of information which never appears in the record. For example he must assess the credibility of the witnesses, including his
client, and the record is usually barren on their trustworthiness.
Certainly, a lawyer would think twice before sponsoring a witness
who is hostile, ill-tempered, "smart-alecky," or prone to being "cornered" by cross-examination. The validity of testimony, and the
theory of the case, often turns not only on what has been said-but
the way it is said.30 Also, the thoroughness of trial counsel and the
zeal with which he pursues the prosecution of the case will affect
a trial defense counsel's strategy. While the accused Oakley could
have taken the stand for the limited purpose of testifying as to the
voluntariness of his confession 3' the decision by counsel not to pursue this course might very well have been based on imponderables
outside the record. And might the suggested course, if pursued,
have adversely affected the court in view of its apparant inconsistency with the main line of defense,
and the presence of other
32
overwhelming evidence of guilt?

Perhaps had the court been apprised in the Oakley case of all
the factors which influenced counsel, it would not have disagreed
with him in his decision not to challenge the confession.
There are cases in the area of "inadequate representation"
where the record often proves adequate. For example, where trial
defense counsel has a loyalty to two accused whose interests are
conflicting, 33 or where the court has interfered with counsel's attempt at effective representation. 34 The area of trial tactics, however, is one of speculation and conjecture and should not be tampered with unless the "four corners of the record" make the efforts
of counsel appear to have been an "empty gesture."
28 Ibid.
29 CM 398157, Withey, 25 CMR 593, 596 (1957).
30 In discussing the importance of cross-examination, the distinguished advocate, Lloyd Paul
Stryker, in his work The Art of Advocacy (1954), on page 87, states, "The general deportment of the
witness . . . will give you many clues. Did he hesitate. Did he look off into space? Did he moisten
his lips and seem perturbed? Did he stammer and needlessly repeat himself? Was there an honest or
shifty expression on his face as he answered? And above all, what is your impression as to how the
iury reacted to him? Did they seem to believe him or were there some jurors, at least, whose
expressions spelled incredulity?"
31 MCM, 1951, paras. 53i, p. 75, 140a, p. 250, and 149b(1), pp. 279-80.
32 In United States v. McMahan, 6 USCMA 709, 21 CMR 31, 45 (1956) (concurring opinion), Judge
Quinn suggests that in appraising inadequacy of representation claims the court should consider "the
overwhelming evidence of guilt." The results of the Oakley retrials lend support to this conclusion.
In the two retrials of Oakley (the Board of Review in 27 CMR 560 (1958) reversed the second conviction), though the voluntar:ncss of his confess on was put in issue, he was convicted. Records, 27 May
1958 and 2 December 1958. CM 398074, Oakley. The third conviction was affirmed by the Board of
Review in 28 CMR 451 (1959) and by the United States Court of Military Appeals in 11 USCMA 187,
29 CMR 3 (1960). Adequacy of representation, however, was an issue only in Oakley's first appeal.
33 E.g., United States v. Faylor, 9 USCMA 547, 26 CMR 327 (1958). There the two co-accused were
tried for wrongful appropriation of a motor vehicle and were represented by the same counsel. Pleas
of guilty were entered and no evidence was presented on the merits. After findings, defense counsel
made an unsworn statement on behalf of both accused. He proceeded to point out that the appellant's
co-accused (who did not appeal) was only 18 years old and had never been convicted of any offense,
and that the appellant was the leader and motivating force of the offense. The court held that
appellant was the leader and motivating force of the offense, and that the appellant had been denied
effective representation, in that trial defense counsel was buying sympathy for the co-accused at the
expense of the appellant. Cf. United States v. Lovett, 7 USCMA 704, 23 CMR 168 (1957), where prior
representation
of government witness by trial defense counsel conflicted with interests of the accused.
4
Para. 8c, MCM, 1951, 68 requires that defense counsel "guard the interests of the accused by all
honorable and legitimate means known to law. It is his duty . . . to represent the accused with
undivided fidelity, and not to divulge his secrets or confidence." In areas where there is a doubt
concerning the equivocal conduct of counsel, it "must be regarded as having been antagonistic to the
best interests of h:s client." United States v. McClusky, 6 USCMA 545, 550, 20 CMR 266, (1955).
34 E.g., ACM S-3514, Mathis, 6 CMR 661 (1952) (interference with right to make closing argument).
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CONCLUSION

Trial defense counsel should not be hamstrung in their efforts
to present the best possible defense. Sufficient protection against
an inadequate defense can be provided by the Hunter rule, for if
the accused discovers during the course of preparation for trial that
he simply cannot agree with or trust the judgment of his counsel,
he may acquire new counsel. And rejection of the Oakley rule
would not be inconsistent with the requirement that the accused
make the final decision of whether to plead guilty and of what evidence to permit in by stipulation. But to permit the accused a new
trial simply because his counsel failed to present one of his claims
to the court would seem to be an anomoly in criminal law. Once a
considered determination has been made by trial defense counsel
as to tactics, a second guessing at an appellate level should be indulged in with great caution lest speculation as to "what might
have been" may result in guessing a competent counsel into incompetency.
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THE NEW COLORADO SECURITIES ACT A QUEST FOR UNIFORMITY
By SANFORD B. HERTZ*
INTRODUCTION

There appears to be little doubt that state regulation of the
security markets is as inevitable as the proverbial "death and taxes."
Today, almost every state has some type of regulation over new
security offerings, investment advisers, brokers and dealers.' These
state laws operate concurrently with the jurisdiction of the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission .2
Anyone concerned today with floatation of a new offering of
securities, organization as a broker or dealer in securities, or investment advising must comply with state as well as federal regulations. In fact, where offerings are multi-state and encompass
many participating underwriters or security dealers, the problems
involved in coordinating all the various facets of state "blue sky"
laws are by far more troublesome than registration with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission. One need only attempt
a study of all the various state statutes and security department
regulations to recognize the need for a uniform securities act which
would, to a great extent, coordinate with federal registration and
acknowledge the regulations of other jurisdictions.
Because of this obvious maze of multiple regulations and
desperate need for uniformity, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in 1947 determined that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws should consider the
drafting of a uniform sale of securities act.3
From this directive, after much work and research, came the
suggested
Uniform Securities Act approved by the conference in
4
1956.
Recent legislation in the State cf Colorado, effective July 1,
1961, recognized the need for uniformity, the necessity for strengthening the powers and rule making authority of the commissioner
of securities, and the importance of federal-state coordination.
The purpose of this article will be to discuss and analyze the
new Colorado Securities Act and to comment on the various important provisions which substantially modify prior existing law.
*Denver Attorney; member of American, Colorado and Denver Bar Associations.

-Explanatory note: As the Colorado Securities Act of 1961 has not yet been assigned an official
session law or statute number, citations to the act will be to the applicable section of H.B. 379, as
enacted. (Chapter 232 is the tentative session low number, assigned by the Revisor of Statutes.)
I Only Delaware and Nevada today have no regulations over securities, brokers and dealers.
rhe District of Columbia is regulated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. See Loss &
Cowett, Blue Sky Low (1958) for a full discussion concerning the various types of security and broker
regulations in the various states.
2 See Loss, Security Regulation, (1951, Supp. 1955). No discussion in this article will cover the
itatutes, rules and regulations of the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission. Much, however,
has been written on federal requisition of the securities market. See generally Securities and Exchange
Commission, Silver Anniversary Commemorative Symposium, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1960); Sym.
posium Contemporary Problems 'in Securities Regulation, 45 Va. L. Rev. 787 (1960); See a multitude of
citations in Loss, Securities Requlation, (1951, Supp. 1955).
t 72 A. B. A. Rep. 98, 297 (1947). For a history of the work of the various committees in the
drafting of the U 'form Securities Act, see Loss& Cowett, Blue Sky Law 233 (1958).
4 Nat'I Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Handbook and Proceedings, 83,
84, 88 (1956).
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No attempt will be made to compare this legislation with the suggested Uniform Securities Act, variations thereof, or other state
security laws.
I. REGISTRATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SALESMEN
Similar to its predecessor, the new law makes it unlawful for
persons to transact business in the State of Colorado as a brokerdealer, issuer-dealer or salesman unless such persons have first
obtained a license from the securities commissioner. 5 The statute
specifically excludes from the general definition of "broker-dealer"
a person who has no place of business in the State of Colorado and
who engages in a minimum amount of security trading. 6 Likewise,
all salesmen must be licensed prior to engaging in, effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities. The licensing
procedure is detailed and specifies the method to obtain either an
initial or renewal license. An application must be filed with the
securities commissioner, together with a consent to service of process on the securities commissioner in the event suit is subsequently
instituted. The securities commissioner is given the power to develop applications and forms calling for basic information necessary for a determination of whether a license should be granted.
The "basic information" contained in the forms promulgated
by the securities commissioner, includes such items as, (1) the
applicant's form and place of organization, (2) the applicant's proposed method of doing business, (3) qualifications and business
history of the applicant, (4) disclosure of any injunction or administrative action which may have been taken against him concerning security matters and (5) a financial condition and history
of the applicant. If the commissioner of securities takes no further
action, the license becomes effective on the 30th day after filing.
However, the commissioner does have authority to make the license
effective prior to that time if he deems it advisable. The commissioner also has a statutory directive to require a minimum capital
of $10,000 for all licensed broker-dealers and issuer-dealers. The
term "capital" is not defined in the statute; however, prior administrative interpretations by the securities commissioner indicates
that $10,000 of liquid assets is necessary to comply with the spirit
and letter of this statutory language. In addition to the aforementioned, the securities commissioner has authority by rule, to
require registered broker-dealers to post a surety bond in an
amount up to $10,000 and to place such other conditions on the bond
as the commissioner in his discretion deems advisable and necessary for the protection of the public. It should be noted that any
appropriate deposit of cash or securities is acceptable in lieu of
the bond requirement. However, the commissioner has no authority to require a bond of any applicant for an issuer-dealer or
broker-dealer license whose net capital, as subsequently defined
by rule of the securities commissioner, exceeds $10,000. The net
result of the aforementioned statutory language would indicate that
an applicant for broker-dealer license would have an alternative
5 H. B. 379, 43rd Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (1961).
6 Id. § 12 (3).
7 Id. §3.
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of posting a bond in the amount of $10,000 or having in lieu thereof
$10,000 of liquid assets. This was the interpretation given the prior
Colorado securities act with respect to a similar financial requirement.'
After a license has been issued, broker-dealers and issuerdealers are required to keep such accounts, correspondence, memoranda and other records and data as the securities commissioner
may prescribe by rule and regulation. These records are required
to be preserved for three years unless otherwise prescribed. In addition, the securities commissioner has the authority by rule to
require broker-dealers and issuer-dealers to file other financial reports and information which he feels necessary to the protection
of the investing public. The statute further permits the securities
commissioner to make such reasonable periodic, special or other
examinations of the books and records of any broker-dealer or
issuer-dealer as he deems necessary. The commissioner has authority to cooperate in such examinations with security commissioners of other states, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, and any national securities exchange or national securities association registered under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. 9
The statute provides the security commissioner with broad
authority to deny, revoke, suspend or cancel registration of a
broker-dealer if he finds that it is in the public interest or if he
finds that the application, the broker-dealer himself or any partner,
8 Interpretation given Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-2-3 (6) (1953) by the Colorado Securities Commissioner.
9 75 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1958).
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officer or director of the broker-dealer has in any way fallen within the scope of the denial or revocation provisions of the act. 10
The statute is very broad with respect to the right to deny, revoke, suspend or cancel registration. In the event an application for
license is incomplete in any material respect or contains any statement which is false or misleading, the commissioner may deny the
application or revoke the effectiveness of the registration and license. In addition, denial or revocation is permitted if the brokerdealer has willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with any
provision of the securities act or prior law; has been convicted within the past ten years of any felony or misdemeanor involving a security or any aspect of the security business; is permanently or
temporarily enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction from
engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice involving any
aspect of the security business; is the subject of an order of the
securities commissioner denying, suspending or revoking his license as a broker-dealer, issuer-dealer or saleman; has been the
subject of an order in the past five years by the security administrators of any other state or of the United States Securities Exchange Commission denying or revoking his license; has been expelled or suspended from a national securities exchange or national
securities association registered under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; or is the subject of any United States Post Office fraud
order. The commissioner also has power to deny or revoke registration if the broker-dealer or any partner or officer thereof has engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business;
is insolvent either in the bankruptcy or equity sense; is not qualified on the basis of training, experience and knowledge of the business; has failed to supervise his salesmen properly; or has failed
to pay the appropriate filing fees. There are other general restrictive clauses governing the powers of the securities commissioner
with respect to denial or revocation of a broker-dealer license
which, in any specific case or circumstance, should be carefully
examined to determine whether the commissioner has acted within
the scope of his statutory authority.
It has been the custom of the securities commissioner and his
predecessors in the State of Colorado to require written examinations of applicants for sales licenses. It has also been customary to
test at least one of the principals of an applicant for registration as
a broker-dealer. The purpose of such examination is to make some
determination as to whether the applicant has any familiarity with
corporation finance or the security business in general. It is the
author's belief that such examinations serve little purpose since
they are of a general nature, are usually taken from other examinations which have been discussed in the security field by other salesmen or applicants, and are not determinative of the applicant's
knowledge. It would appear that a careful oral examination of the
applicant, a closer check of his background, and constant supervision of salesmen by the broker-dealer and the securities commissioner would be more effective in protecting the investing public.
It may be that only the threat of continued investigation and super10 H.B. 379, 43rd Gen. Ass., Ist Reg. Sess. i 5 (1961).
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vision will deter a salesman from making misrepresentations to his
customers or clients.
In the event the securities commissioner either postpones or
suspends a license, then, upon the entry of an order, the commissioner is obligated by statute to promptly notify the applicant or
licensee as well as the employer (or prospective employer) and
immediately set the matter down for hearing. Hearings are to be
held within fifteen days of a written request for such hearing. If
no hearing is requested and none is ordered by the securities commissioner, the order remains in effect until it is subsequently modified or vacated. After the hearing has been held, if one is requested, then the securities commissioner may either modify or vacate
the order, or extend it until final determination.
A broker-dealer or salesman may withdraw his registration
and surrender his license by giving written notice to the securities
commissioner. Such withdrawal becomes effective thirty days after
receipt thereof, unless a revocation or suspension proceeding is
pending or one is subsequently instituted by the commissioner
within the thirty day period. 1 This procedure is generally identical
to the procedure utilized by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in handling applications for withdrawal of
registered broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.12

The new statute clearly indicates that no order may be entered
under the aforementioned section of the securities act without appropriate prior notice to the applicant or licensee and opportunity
for hearing with written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 3
The right of hearing is essential to preserve the constitutional rights
of all applicants and licensees under this statute.
The need for comprehensive regulation of brokers, dealers and
salesmen is apparent, for in the great majority of cases the investing
public relies directly upon the oral representation of these persons
in making investment decisions. Only through a thorough and strict
administration of these registration and licensing powers can the
purposes of the statute become meaningful, since most persons who
cannot or will not analyze their own investment needs will look to
the broker or registered representative for such advice.
II. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES
The new statute prohibits any person from offering or selling
any security in the State of Colorado until it is registered under
the securities act, unless the security or transaction thereof is ex14
empt from registration as provided in the act.
The new statute has made some radical changes with respect
to the method of handling registration of securities and is fashioned
somewhat after the Uniform Securities Act in providing three
separate methods of registering securities for public sale. Securities
under the new act may be registerd by notification,1 5 by coordina11
12
13
14
15

Id. § 5 (4).
Securities Exchange Act § 15 (b), 75 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (6) (1958).
H.B. 379, 43rd Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. § 5 (5) (1961).
Id. § 6.
Id. § 7.
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tion, 6 and by qualification.17 Each of the aforementioned methods
of registering securities for public sale will be discussed in detail.
Special emphasis is placed upon registration by coordination and
qualification since these grant various "merit" powers to the securities commissioner. These merit provisions are a departure
from the prior securities act which followed the federal theory of
disclosure. They were promulgated by the legislature in an attempt
to provide additional statutory powers to the securities commissioner for use in regulating highly promotional issues which in the
past had caused financial losses to the investing public and embarrassment to the securities department through the wide publicity received.
A. Registration by Notification18
Registration by notification is restricted to securities of issuers
or predecessors who have been in continuous operation for at least
a five year period. There must not have been a default in the payment of any principal, interest or dividends, or any fixed maturity,
fixed interest or fixed dividend securities of the issuer or its predecessors within the current fiscal year of filing or the three preceding fiscal years. In addition, the issuer or predecessors of such
issuers during the three years prior to filing, must have had average
net earnings, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting practices, equal to at least five per cent of the amount of
such outstanding securities. The statute carefully defines the measure of the amount to which the five per cent will apply, as the
maximum offering price or the market price on a day selected by
the issuer within a specified period prior to the filing of the registration statement.
The act provides that any security, other than a certificate of
interest or participation in an oil, gas or mining title, lease or payments out of production under such title or lease, may be registered
for a non-issuer distribution (a secondary distribution) if the security is of the same class as that which has been registered under
the Securities Act or a prior securities act. If the security was
issued originally pursuant to an exemption under the present act
or prior securities act, the same provision will apply.
16 Id. § 8.
17 Id. § 9.
1 Id. § 7.
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The statute requires basic minimum information to be filed
with the securities commissioner. Requirements include a statement
demonstrating eligibility for registration by notification, the name
and address of the issuer, the basic organization thereof, and the
general character and location of its business. In addition, a financial statement is required together with other basic items such as
the description of the securities being registered and a consent to
having legal process served on the securities commissioner in the
event of subsequent litigation. This registration statement, assuming that no stop order is in effect and that no proceeding is pending
thereunder, becomes effective the afternoon of the second full business day after filing the registration statement, or the last amendment thereto, or at such earlier time as the securities commissioner,
in his discretion, determines.
It should be noted, therefore, that registration by notification
is generally restricted to "seasoned" or "blue chip" security offerings, and those in which the members of the investing public need
no basic disclosure requirement (prospectus) or other protective
feature of the act. As a practical matter, those issuers who can
qualify for registration by notification may also utilize the provisions of registration by coordination (as described hereafter).
Since most offerings will be registered or qualified from an exemption registration under Regulation A with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, registration by coordination
will more likely be used, thus, registration by notification is rarely
used; however, there are certain issuers and certain types of security offerings which may find the provisions set forth in this type
of registration to be helpful and less cumbersome than registration
by coordination or qualification.' 9
B. Registration by Coordination0
This type of registration may only be used if a security has
been registered with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, or has been exempted from registration pursuant to
filings made under
21 section 3 (b) or 3 (a) of the Securities Act of
1933, as amended.
The prior Colorado Securities Act 2 permitted registration by
coordination for any security for which a registration statement
had been filed with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission. In this respect, this portion of the new statute makes
no variation on prior existing law. This portion of the new act
generally covers the same provisions set forth in the Uniform Securities Act. However, with respect to the right to utilize registration by coordination, applicable to filings made pursuant to sections 3 (b) or 3 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and
19 These would include local companies sufficiently seasoned and having no need for going
through the S.E.C. procedures.
20 H.B. 379, 43rd Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. 8 (1961).
21 Id. § 8. With respect to discussions on filings under section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended, and, in particular, Regulation A thereunder, see Hertz, The Federal Securities Act of
1933, Revised Regulation A. 33 DICTA 307 (1956); Erickson, The Federal Securities Act of 1933Some Recurring Problems Found In Regulation A, 36 DICTA 402 (1959). With respect to exemptions
under the intra-state section of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, see Hertz, Federal Securities
Act of 1933-The Intra-State Exemption of Section 3(a)(11)-Foct or Fiction?, 34 DICTA 289 (1957).
For a general discussion of Regulation A, see Loss, Security Regulation, 380 (1951); Loss, Security
Regulation, (Supp. 1955 at 165).
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-5 (1957).
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in particular, Regulation A filings thereunder, the new law is a
departure from recommendations of the Uniform Securities Act.
This provision permits all securities which are offered to the public
pursuant to any filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to be registered with the securities commission
by coordination, whether it be under a registration statement,
Regulation A or other such filings made under the Securities Act
of 1933, as amended. The provision permits those issuers who utilize
the exemption of Regulation A, rather than registration, to take advantage of registration by coordination; this procedure is considerably more simple than registration by qualification (described hereafter).
In addition, those securities which are registered by coordination do not come under the "merit" provisions of the new securities
act; and the securities commissioner has no power to pass upon the
merits of the offering, or the entire venture, if the securities have
been registered or qualified from exemption under Regulation A.
A registration by coordination becomes effective the same
moment the federal registration statement becomes effective, or at
the time the offering may otherwise be commenced in accordance
with rules, regulations or orders of the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission. This assumes that no stop order or suspension order is in effect or pending and that the registration statement has been on file with the securities commissioner for at least
ten days. It further assumes that the price of the securities to be
offered has been on file with the securities commissioner for at
least two business days or such shorter period as the securities commissioner by rate or otherwise may indicate. Other basic information is required of the registrant. This includes primarily, copies of
the prospectus, offering circular, or other offering sheets together
with all amendments thereto filed with the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended. Once the securities commissioner has received the copies
of the filings made with the Federal Commission, whether it be
under a registration statement or pursuant to the Regulation A
exemption, the securities commissioner will have the basic information required to afford disclosure to members of the investing public. This procedure simplifies the registration of securities in the
State of Colorado when filings have been made with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission. The rationale of this
legislation seems to be basic, and places the burden for processing
the detailed information on the federal commission. The staff and
funds available to the federal agency for enforcement and processing work are far more extensive than that of the state commission.
Therefore, all filings which are made pursuant to registration statements, or pursuant to regulation A, or such sinilar exemptions are
not examined by the securities commissioner of the state except to
see that the formalities of the statute and regulations have been
complied with; the burden is thereupon shifted to the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission where it rightfully belongs.
In light of this discussion it is important once again to point out
that the power of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission does not carry with it a right to pass on the merits of the
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entire venture, but merely to provide basic disclosure to enable
the investing public to determine the investment merits of the
securities offered. However, as a practical matter, those who practice before the United States Securities and Exchange Commission,
and those who have had experience with this regulatory agency
are aware that the basic disclosure requirements are very much
inter-woven with the merits of offering. The type of disclosure
required goes to the very essence of the venture to the extent that
one cannot help but think that the federal agency is passing on the
investment merits of the proposed offering. Naturally, any such
discussion with the staff of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission would bring a resounding denial, but in many
instances "what they do speaks louder than what they say."
C. Registration by Qualification,"
The new statute provides that any security may be registered
by qualification even though it may also be registered by either
notification or coordination. As a practical matter, however, no
issuer would attempt to register by qualification where the facilities
of registering by notification or coordination were available.
The statute requires that a great deal of material be submitted
when filing by qualification. Included are many exhibits to be filed
along with the required documents. In the future it would appear
that those offerings made only to residents of Colorado, and offered
pursuant to exemption from the registration provisions of section
3 (a) (11) of the Securities Act of 1933,24as amended, will be registered by qualification under the new law.
One of the most significant departures from prior existing law
can be found in the area surrounding registration by qualification.
These departures include the "merit" powers placed in the commissioner of securities to not only pass upon the adequacy of the
disclosure of the documents filed, but to also require, by rule or
order, that any securities issued within the past three years to be
issued to a promoter for a consideration substantially different
from the public offering price, or to any person for a consideration
23 H.B. 379, 43rd Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. § 9 (1961).
1
24 For a discussion of the intra-state exemption of Section 3(a)( 1) see Hertz, Federal Securities
Act of 1933-The Intro-State Exemption of Section 3(a)(11)-Fact or Fiction? 34 DICTA 289 (1957).
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other than cash, be deposited in escrow; and that that the proceeds
from the sale of the registered securities be impounded or escrowed
until the issuer receives a specified amount. The securities commissioner has also been given the authority to determine, by rule
or order, all conditions of any escrow or impounding provision.2
This section provides that the commissioner may deny, suspend,
or revoke any registration filed by qualification if the issuer's enterprise or methods of business includes or would include activities
which are illegal where performed; would have worked or tended
to work a fraud upon purchasers; the offering is made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sel'ers' discounts, commissions or other compensation; promoters profits or participation
are excessive; unreasonable amounts or kinds of option are exacted;
or where the issuer failed to escrow not less than eighty per cent of
the funds collected from any registration of securities with an escrow holder if the commissioner
ordered the impoundment or es26
crow of such funds.
As can be readily seen, this registration by qualification portion
of the securities act gives vast powers to the commissioner of securities to examine not only the disclosure set forth in the prospectus
and other documents filed, but affords to the commissioner a right
to examine the entire merits of the offering. He becomes the sole
judge as to whether the offering is fair and equitable to the investing public. In effect his judgment on the merits of the offering are,
to a certain extent, substituted for that of the investing public.
Thus, if he believes that officers, directors and promoters of the
company have received securities or options in excess of value paid
the issuer, that the underwriter's or seller's commissions are excessive, or that such other conditions as would be encompassed within
the language "worked or tended to work a fraud upon purchasers"
exist, he may deny registration of the securities and the issuer will
be denied the right to go to the public for equity capital.
It appears that those issuers who do not intend to utilize any of
the filing methods prescribed by the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission for public offering and who may decide to
make an offering only to residents of the State of Colorado, based
upon the section 3 (a) (11) exemption of the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended, are now faced with an additional burden of complying
with the merit provisions promulgated by the securities commissioner. In the organization of any venture it must take into consideration that which the commissioner may think is meritorius and
will not tend to work a fraud upon purchasers. This will certainly
be a factor in encouraging issuers or underwriters to utilize either
registration process or the Regulation A exemption.
The writer has always opposed any merit type provision where
a commissioner or his staff would have the right to sit in judgment
as to what investment securities the public should be offered. The
fact that the offerings are those which are normally exempt from
federal registration, as being offered only within the state, does not
in any way make the merit determination by the securities com25 H.B. 379, 43rd Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. § 10(7) (1956).
26 Id. §§ 11 (1)(d), (e), (f) and 11(2).
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missioner any more desirable. However, there is a great tendency
today, based upon the attitude of the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission towards intra-state exemptions, as well as
general expediency in equity financing, to avoid the use of the
intra-state exemptions. 2 7 These provisions in the new securities
act would certainly implement the attitude of the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission as well as encourage, to say
the least, filing with the federal agency.
As one examines the new statute, it becomes readily apparent
that to avoid the merit provisions imposed by the securities commissioner, and especially the impounding of funds, one need only file
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. Although the Federal Commission has the power to impose an indirect
type of merit provision through its disclosure requirement, it is
doubtful whether federal law would support such imposition by
"
the United States Securities Exchange Commission or its staff. 1
Denial or revocation under registration by qualification provides the issuer with appropriate hearing, and would certainly
appear to afford him his "day in court." However, in the area of
public financing, constitutional rights afforded by the right of hearing and appeal are relatively meaningless. As Professor Davis has
wisely stated, "If what the Commission finally requires of the
Registrant is thought to be arbitrary or unreasonable,
the Regis29
trant has no practical recourse except to comply.

III.

NON-ISSUER DIsTRIBUTION

The prior securities law was, at best, ambiguous with respect
to transactions involving the offer and sale of securities where the
issuer of those securities was not directly affected or involved.
From a literal reading of the prior statute it would appear that it
was unlawful or prohibited for any person to offer or sell any securities unless registered with the securities commissioner, or unless an exemption from registration was available. What then would
be the result with respect to an offer by brokers or dealers or other
such persons who did not control the issuer where such offerings
30
were generally made through public distribution methods?
Because of this ambiguity and uncertainty, and particularly
because of problems raised by investment bankers, an effort was
made to write into the new securities law the right of a brokerdealer to file a registration statement.
Pursuant to this, the new statute appears quite clear in stating
that a registration statement may be filed by not only the issuer
or licensed broker-dealer in securities, but by any other person on
whose behalf the offering is to be made.3 1 In addition, the statute
relieves the broker-dealer or such other persons from filing all the
documents and information generally required when such information is not available. Therefore, a broker-dealer concerned with the
problem of whether registration would be required, may now file
27
28
29
30
Lohf,

The Federal Commission has sought to discourage the use of the Intra-State Exemption.
In the strict sense, the federal act permits only disclosure powers.
I Davis, Administrative Law § 4.01 (1958).
for an able discussion of the prior Colorado law with respect to non-issuer transactions see
The Colorado Securities Law, 35 DICTA 271 (1958).

31 H.B. 379, 43rd Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. § 10 (1961).
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his statement registering the securities he proposes to offer through
public distribution methods and therefore avoid the possibility of a
technical violation of the state securities laws.
All registration statements, whether filed by the issuer or other
persons, remain effective until revoked by the securities commissioner or until the termination upon request by the registrant with
the consent of the securities commissioner. In addition, all outstanding securities of the same class as registered securities are
considered to be registered for the purpose of any non-issuer transaction, so long as the registration statement is effective between
the 30th day after the entry of a stop order suspending or revoking
the effectiveness of the registration statement (if the registration
statement itself did not relate in whole or in part to a non-issuer
distribution) and one year from the effective date of the registration statement. 2
This section further provides that a registration statement may
not be withdrawn for one year from its effective date if the securities of the same class are outstanding. A statement may be
withdrawn otherwise only on the order of the securities commissioner. During the effectiveness of a registration statement, the
securities commissioner may, by rule or otherwise, require written
reports to be filed, no more often than quarterly, to keep the information contained in the registration statement reasonably current
and to disclose the progress of the offering.33 However, in the event
that the offering is a non-issuer distribution, written reports may
not be required by the securities commissioner unless the information is known to the person making the non-issuer distribution or
can be furnished by them without unreasonable effort or expense.
Thus, the new law has clarified substantially the prior existing
gray area concerning non-issuer distributions and the right of
broker-dealers and other persons to file registration statements with
the securities commissioner. This entire provision had the blessing
of the investment banking fraternity and was most welcome.
IV. EXEMPTIONS

Similar to the prior law are two basic types of exemptions
which exist in the new Securities Act. The first type of exemption
covers the nature and type of the security itself and the second
32 Id. § 10(9).
33 Id.
10(10).
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covers the transaction which is involved rather than the type of
security offered or sold.
With respect to the security exemptions,3 4 the new law exempts
from the registration requirements those securities issued or guaranteed by governmental bodies such as the federal government,
state, or any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof. This section also exempts any security issued or guaranteed
by the Province of Canada and securities of any foreign government with which the United States currently maintains diplomatic
relations. The act exempts securities of any bank organized under
the laws of the United States or any bank or savings institution
organized under the laws of any state. Also exempt from the registration provisions are securities of any company which has been
continuously in business in the State of Colorado for more than
twenty years and holds first mortgages on real estate located
in Colorado, securities of the United States, or cash or a combination thereof equal to one hundred per cent of the amount of the
securities issued. Also, securities issued by and representing interests in, or debt of, any federal savings and loan association or any
building and loan or similar association organized under the laws
of a state are exempt. All securities of insurance companies organized under the laws of any state and insurance companies having a
Certificate of Authority from the Insurance Commissioner of the
State of Colorado to do business in this state are also exempt. Securities of any federal credit union or any credit union, industrial
loan association or similar association; securities issued or guaranteed by any railroad or any other common carrier, public utility or
holding company subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission; securities of any registered holding company
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or a subsidiary of such a company within the meaning of that act are listed
as exempt. In addition, securities listed or approved for listing upon
notice of issuance on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange or the Midwest Stock Exchange or any other security of the same issuer which
is of senior or substantially equal rank to those securities listed
on national stock exchanges fall within the exemption provision.
And finally, all securities which are issued by eleemosynary institutions operated not for private profit but for religious, educational, benevolent, charitable, fraternal, social, athletic or reformatory purposes or as a chamber of commerce or trade or professional
association are likewise exempt from registration.
In addition to those securities which are exempt, certain transactions involving the offer and sale of securities are also excused
from the registration provisions of the act.3 5 Most notable of these
are isolated non-issuer transactions, whether effected through a
broker-dealer or not, and any transaction pursuant to an offer directed by the offeror to not more than twenty-five persons in the
State of Colorado during any period of twelve consecutive months,
whether or not the offeror or any of the offerees is then present
in the State of Colorado. This latter exemption is conditioned on
34 Id.
13(1)(a)-(i).
35 Id. §13(2)(a)-(1).
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the fact that the seller must reasonably believe that all purchasers
in the State of Colorado. This latter exemption is conditioned on
mission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly
for soliciting any prospective purchasers in the State. The commissioner, with respect to the latter exemption, has the authority
to make rules or issue orders concerning any security or transaction of securities and to withdraw or further condition the exemption by increasing or decreasing the number of offerees permitted.
Exemption conditions may be waived altogether. A discussion of
what may or may not be a private offering or an "isolated transaction" could compass an entire article by itself and the reader is
cautioned that attention must be given not only to the provisions of
the new law, but also to the Federal Securities Act of 1933, as
permitting private transactions must be
amended. The provisions
36
carefully analyzed.
Suffice it to say that anyone attempting to rely upon the private offering exemption under the new Colorado law or the
Federal Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or both, should carefully examine the substantive law concerning these transactions
substantive elements
and make every effort to comply with both the
37
and the procedural form of the exemptions.
Non-issuer distributions or transactions effected by registered
broker-dealers pursuant to unsolicited offer or offers to buy are
included in the long registration exemption list of the new act;
however, the securities commissioner may promulgate rules or
regulations requiring that the customer acknowledge upon a specified form that the sale was unsolicited and that a signed copy
of each38 form be preserved by the broker-dealer for a specified
period.
Offers to sell securities to banks, savings instiiutions, trust
companies, insurance companies, and investment companies as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940 are likewise exempt
from registration provisions. It can be readily seen that these persons do not need the protection of the registration provisions as
does the general unsophisticated investor, and in most cases, such
organizations have their own specialized departments to analyze
the investment merits of securities.
The new statute contains other exemptions and the reader is
directed to a thorough examination of this section. It is suggested
that before any exemption is utilized prior notification be given to
the securities commissioner, if at all possible, so that he may, in
effect, review the transaction and advise as to whether the trans36 For an orticle discussing the "private offering" exemption see Mehler, The Securities Act
of 1933: "Private or Public" Offering, 32 DICTA 359 (1955). See also S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co.,
346 U.S. 119 (1953); Federal Securities Act. § 4, 48 Sant. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1958).
37 For restriction of the private offering exemption under the Federal Securities Act of 1933, as
amended, see Repass v. Rees, 174 Fed. Supp. 898 (D.C. Colo. 1959). This case held that assignments
3f certain fractional undivided interests in oil and gas leases sold by the defendants were not
exempt from the registration provisions of the Federal Securities Act as "non-public" offering securities
where the defendant failed to show the lack of public need for protection with respect to the securities.
The court granted the right of the purchasers to rescind the transaction and ruled that although the
plaintiffs were experienced investors and did not require the protection of the act, it was incumbent
upon the defendants to establish that purchasers and offerees other than the plaintiff were similarly
experienced. Such burden had not been sustained. This case goes a long way in narrowing the private
offering exemption under the Federal Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and might very well have
serious impact with respect to the attempt of sellers of securities to rely on the "isolated transaction"
language of the new Colorado Securities Act.
38 At the time of this writing no such rules or regulations have been made and no forms have
been promulgated for this purpose by the securities commissioner.
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action, or the type or nature of the security falls within the exemptions. It should be carefully noted that the burden of proving an
exemption from the registration provisions is on the person claiming it 3and
not upon the department of securities nor any other
9
person.
V. GENERAL PROVISIONS

The new act, similar to the prior act, gives the securities commissioner authority to promulgate rules and direct orders requiring the filing of any sales literature or other material intended for
distribution to prospective investors, unless the security or transaction itself is exempt from the registration provisions. 40 By statute,
it is unlawful to make any false or misleading statements or omissions in any document filed with the commission. 41 An application
for registration or a registration statement effectively registered
with the commission does not constitute a finding by the securities
commissioner that any documents filed under the act are true, complete and not misleading. 42 Moreover, the fact that a document is
filed or that an exemption is available does not mean that the commissioner has in any way passed upon the merits of or given approval to the issue. Indeed, the act makes it unlawful for any person to represent that the commissioner has in any way passed upon
the merits of,4 3recommends or has given approval to any security
or transaction.
The reader is cautioned that under no circumstances should
any issuer, broker-dealer or any other person offering securities for
sale indicate or intimate that either the securities commissioner
or the United States Securities and Exchange Commission has
passed upon the merits of any security offering or upon the investment quality of that security. Naturally, it is impossible for any
regulatory agency to adequately advise itself concerning all the
39 H.B.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.

379, 43rd Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. § 13(3) (1961).
§ 14.
§ 15.
§ 16.
§ 16(2).
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merits of the venture, and regulatory agencies in themselves do
not purport to make investment decisions. This is true in spite of
the fact that under the new law the securities commissioner with
respect to registration by qualification, is given "merit" powers.
The new law also provides that the securities commissioner
at his discretion may make such public or private investigations
as he deems necessary to determine whether any person has
violated or is about to violate any provisions of the act or any rule
or order promulgated thereunder. The commissioner is also given
authority to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses,
compel their attendance, take evidence and require the production
of books, records, papers and such other documents as the commissioner in his discretion deems relevant or material to the general
inquiry. In the event any person fails or refuses to obey a subpoena,
the commissioner may make application to the district court of
the City and County of Denver to enforce the subpoena and require the person to appear or produce certain documentary eviis contempt and such
dence. Failure to obey the order of the Court
44
a person may be punished accordingly.
In addition, the statute provides that no person is excused from
attending or testifying or producing documents solely because it
may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. However, similar to federal practice, no individual may be
prosecuted or made subject to penalty concerning anything upon
which he has been compelled to testify after claiming his privilege
against self-incrimination. This exempts, however, the prosecution
43
and punishment for perjury or contempt in such testimony.
The commissioner has authority to make application to the
district court of the City and County of Denver to enjoin acts or
practices that would constitute a violation of any of the provisions
46
of the new act or any rule or order promulgated under it.
The act provides that any person who willfully violates any of
the provisions of the act or who willfully files any material knowing it to be false or misleading shall, upon conviction, be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years or
both. The securities commissioner may refer such evidence as is
available concerning violations of the act to the attorney general
or the proper district attorney who may, with or without such
reference,
institute the appropriate criminal proceedings under the
47
act.

The new act also contains civil liability provisions which provide that an action may be brought against any person who offers
or sells a security in violation of the registration provisions of the
act, or any person who offers or sells a security by means of any
untrue statement of material facts. Also subject to liability is one
who fails to state material facts necessary to make his statements
not misleading. These civil liability provisions permit the purchaser to rescind a transaction where registration was required,
or where false or misleading statements or omissions were made
with respect to security transactions, and to recoup the considera44
45
46
47

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
5
5

18.
18(4).
19.
20.
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tion paid for the security. In addition, interest at the rate of six
per cent per annum from the date of payment and reasonable costs
and attorneys fees, less any income received from the security are
recoverable. This provision also permits a suit for damages if the
purchaser is no longer the owner of the securities. In addition to
permitting the purchaser to bring suit against the immediate seller,
any person who directly or indirectly controls the seller is also subject to suit and liable under the act. Thus, all principals and agents
are likewise controlled by these provisions and may find themselves
liable for violations
of the act and subject to civil suits for rescis4
sion or damages. 1
It should also be noted that all suits under this provision of the
securities act must be brought within two years after the contract
of sale. There are other general provisions with respect to bringing
civil liability suits under the act, and the reader is cautioned to
carefully examine the provisions of this section before the institution of any suit. The Securities Act of 1933, as amended, contains
similar provisions and thus, perhaps, a choice may be afforded to a
49
prospective plaintiff who finds himself aggrieved.
All final orders of the securities commissioner may be reviewed
by application to the district court of the City and County of Denver and thereafter appeal may be made to the supreme court. 50 This
section sets forth the method and procedure for handling such
applications and the reader is directed to the specific language in
the event such application is ever necessary.
CONCLUSION

The new act takes an important step forward with respect to
federal-state coordination, and the simplicity of registering securities registered or qualified with the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission is most welcome.
The clarification of non-issuer distributions and, 'in particular,
the right of registered broker-dealers to file registration statements
in order to avoid technical violations of the act is indeed helpful
and puts an end to the plight of the investment banking fraternity
in this area.
Problems of interpretation and administration will naturally
arise, but only time and history will bear out our ultimate conclusion that the act is sound and was very much needed in a state
which has had a multitude of public offerings. The approach to the
public for equity capital seems to be a growing trend, and a law
with adequate protection to the investing public as well as flexibility for issuers and broker-dealers is indeed essential to continued
public confidence in our equity markets. The writer believes that
Colorado now has such a law.
48 Id. § 21.
49 Federal Securities Act. §§ 12, 13, 15, 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1958).
50 H.B. 379, 43rd Gen, Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. § 22 (1961).
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THE NEW COLORADO CHATTEL MORTGAGE ACT
By STEVE HELLERSTEIN*
GENERAL STATEMENT

The Legislature, at its session in 1961, approved a new Chattel
Mortgage Act for Colorado.1 This new act became effective on
July 1, 1961. The provisions of the Inventory Mortgage Act 2 and
the provisions of the Certificate of Title Act 3 are not affected by
the new act. The enactment is designed to relate to general chattel
mortgages and the existing statutes, the Inventory Mortgage Act
and the Certificate of Title Act, govern the mortgaging of motor
vehicles.
ANALYSIS OF SECTIONS

Section 1. Validity Against Third Persons. This Section restates the provisions of the previous act which recites that a chattel
mortgage is enforceable in Colorado against the rights and interest
of third parties if the provisions of the act are complied with or,
in the alternative, possession of the mortgaged property is delivered
to and retained by the mortgagee.
Section 2. Property Subject to Mortgage. The new act permits
the mortgaging of any kind or character of personal property including livestock, the natural increase thereof, immediate and
remote; livestock feed notwithstanding the same may be consumed;
crops, including fruits and berries, annual or perennial, which
may be harvested within a period of one year next after the date
of the execution of the mortgage, whether or not grown, growing
or planted; household goods, providing each spouse signs the
mortgage unless (1) the husband and wife are not residing together, or (2) the mortgage is a purchase money mortgage; afteracquired property; property not in existence or property to which
title was not in the mortgagor at the time of the execution and
delivery of the mortgage.
The new items added in the above section form the exemption
of the purchase money mortgage of household goods from the
necessity of the signature of both husband and wife where the
purchase was made by either of them. This was law decided by
the Colorado Supreme Court. 4 The placing of such language in
the statute merely confirms the holding of the court.
The question of mortgaging after-acquired property or property
not in existence or property to which title was not in the mortgagor, has been a controversial one in Colorado.5 To lay at rest
any questions of the rights of a mortgagee to take a valid mortgage
upon the aforesaid property, appropriate language is contained
in the new act. Obviously, the mortgage is not effective on such
property until the same comes into being or the title of the property is acquired by the mortgagor.
*Member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations and of the Denver firm of Hellerstein and
Hellerstein.
I Senate Bill 168, approved April 24, 1961.
2 Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 20-2-1 to 20-2-12(1953).
3 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 13-6-1 to 13-6-42 (1953).
4 Welty v. Burks. 76 Colo. 365, 231 Pac. 660 (1924).
5 Hellerstein, Chattel Mortgages in Colorado § 19 (5th ed. 1956).

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST,

1961

Section 3. Description. Probably the most controversial and
litigated problem in chattel mortgages has been the question of
proper descriptions.6 The new act provides that property may be
described either specifically or in general terms. If in general
terms, the location of the mortgaged property must be sufficiently
fixed by the mortgage. Further, the identity of the mortgaged
property may be shown by extrinsic evidence. Heretofore, general
descriptions, even though the location of the security was stated,
did not create a valid mortgage.
Section 4. Filing or recording. With "snap out" forms and
combined notes and mortgages and other similar forms in use, a
problem has arisen as to which instrument in the set used should
be filed or recorded. The new act provides that either the original
or duplicate original, or a copy thereof certified to be a true copy
by a notary public or other officer authorized to take an acknowledgement, can be filed or recorded in the county where the property is situated. It is still necessary that the mortgage be filed or
recorded in the county where the property is situated. However,
a duplicate original may be filed, which overcomes the difficulty
in using snap-out forms.T
Section 5. Duration - Mortgage Status Statement. A great deal
of difficulty has arisen because extensions of mortgages were required to be filed within six months from date of maturity, and
annual statements were required to be filed within a period of two
years and ninety days after the date of the filing or recording of
the mortgage when the maturity of the mortgage exceeded two
years. Often two instruments had to be filed. In some instances
where the mortgage exceeded the two year period (as to such
mortgages annual statements were required) certain mortgages
were just over the period by a few days, or by reason of adjustment in payments, the mortgage might run for two years and fifteen days. The mortgagee found himself in the position where he
failed to file the annual statement but had filed the extension. As
a result the lien would be lost when the rights of third parties
intervened. The situation was confusing; in section 5 an attempt
has been made to simplify the procedure.
Under the new act "Extensions" and "Annual Statements" are
both eliminated. A new form will be used designated as a "Mortgage Status Statement." The requirements for filing of the statement are as follows:
1. If a mortgage is filed or recorded and the final maturity
of the mortgage is three years or less, then the mortgage
is enforceable until maturity and for a period six months
thereafter. A Mortgage Status Statement must be filed
6 Id. ch. IV.
7 Form of Mortgages. The new act docs not change the form of chattel mortgages to be used.
The forms presently in use, if 'n conformity with the former Chattel Mortgage Act, may be used under
the new oct.
Recording and Filing Fees. The act is silent as to fees required to be paid to the clerk and recorder
for recording or filing mortgages or Mortqaae Status Statements. Under the general Colorado laws
relating to filing, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 56-4-3 (1953), filing fees, unless otherwise fixed specifically by
statute, are seventy-five cents for each instrument. Hence, fees required for the filing of a mortgage
or Mortgage Status Statement will be seventy-fve cents. Where more than one mortgagee or more
than one mortgagor are involved, usually the clerk and recorder receives an additional fifteen cents
for each additional name shown. Recording fees will be governed by the general statute relating to
recording. The clerk and recorder will charge for recording instruments $1.25 per page plus an additional
fifteen cents where there is more than one mortgagee or mortgagor.
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within a period of six months after the maturity date of
the mortgage to continue the lien in effect. Thereafter,
successive Mortgage Status Statements must be filed (to
continue the validity of the mortgage) annually within a
period of six months from the anniversary of filing the
first Statement.8
2. If the final maturity of the mortgage is more than three
years, then such mortgage is valid and enforceable for the
full period thereof, provided that within a period of six
months after three years from the date of the mortgage
a Mortgage Status Statement is filed. Thereafter successive annual Mortgage Status Statements must be filed
within six months from each anniversary date of the filing
of the first Status Statement to continue the validity of the
mortgage.9
If a Mortgage Status Statement is not filed when required, such
failure does not effect the validity of the mortgage if third persons
have not acquired rights during the period when the statement
should have been filed. The mortgage will be considered in force
against third persons when the statement is filed, even though
the filing is late.
The form of the Mortgage Status Statement is simple. The
information therein to be contained is provided by this section of
the act and a copy of a suggested form is set out below.
The Mortgage Status Statement may be' executed by the mortgagee or his assignee or by an agent or attorney for the mortgagee
or assignee. The mere designation of the party showing his capacity
in executing the statement is taken as sufficient evidence of his
authority.
If a mistake is made in the Mortgage Status Statement as to
the amount due, such fact does not invalidate the statement.
8 For example: If a mortgage is dated Jan. 2, 1961 and has a maturity of one year (less than
three years) i.e., Jan. 2, 1962, then within six months from Jan. 2, 1962 (being the maturity date)
the first Mortgage Status Statement is required to be filed. Assuming the first Mortgage Status Statement is filed on July 1, 1962, then within a period of six months from July 1, 1963 and annually
thereafter within a period of six months from each anniversary date of filing the first statement,
successive Mortgage Status Statements must be filed to continue the validity of the mortgage.
9 If a mortgage has a maturity of five years (in excess of three years) then commencing within
three years and six months from the original date of the mortgage, the first Mortgage Status Statement must be filed; thereafter annually within six months from the anniversary date of the filing
of the first Mortgage Status Statement, successive statements must be filed. By filing Mortgage Status
Statements the validity of the mortgage is maintained even after maturity of the mortgage.
To illustrate, if a mortgage is dated Jan. 2, 1961 with a maturity of Jan. 2, 1966, the first
Statement must be filed between Jan. 2, 1964 and July 2, 1964. Assuming the first Mortgage Status
Statement is filed March 15, 1964 then within six months from March 15, 1965 and annually within
six months from each March 15 thereafter, successive statements must be filed.
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Section 6. Future Advances. The new act continues the future
advance provisions contained in the former act. The new act more
clearly states what was intended by the old act and no change in
substance is effected. A mortgagee taking a future advance mortgage, follows the statute by reciting the specific sum to be advanced as the maximum, the date prior to which advances shall be
completed, and the date on which the last installment of the indebtedness secured thereby shall mature. The advances may be
made and repaid again so long as the aggregate amounts of such
advances owing at any time do not exceed the specific amount recited to be secured as a maximum by the mortgage.
Section 7. Purchaserwith Actual Notice. The section continues
the provisions of the former act which recites that any person who
obtains an interest in any personal property covered by a mortgage
which is valid and effective between the parties, with actual notice
of such mortgage, acquires such interest as though the mortgage
was filed or recorded as required by the act.
Section 8. Validity between Parties. This section continues the
effect of the former act, namely, that a chattel mortgage is good
between the parties until the debt is paid or barred by the statute
of limitations.
Section 9. CorporationTrust Deed or Mortgage. Under the former
provision of the Chattel Mortgage Act it was provided that a
corporation executing a mortgage or trust deed upon realty and
including personal property therein effected a lien upon the personal property without the necessity of complying with any provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Act. This proision is continued
except that under Section 11 of the new act, it is now provided that
a corporate trust deed or mortgage containing real and personal
property therein shall be indexed by the clerk and recorder as a
chattel mortgage as well as under the real property indices. As a
result, an examiner of the chattel mortgage indices will be able to
obtain such information. This should lead to less problems in connection with corporation trust deeds and mortgages containing both
personal and real property as security.
Section 10. Acknowledgment. This section continues the former
act in that there is no mandatory provision that mortgages be acknowledged. If ackowledged, however, and of record, such instrument may be admitted in evidence without the necessity of proof
of execution.
Section 11. Recorder to Keep Index Records- Releases. The
same provisions as heretofore in effect with reference to the c'erk
and recorder keeping indices as to chattel mortgage of record are
retained. Mortgages may be released by separate instruments or
by an appropriate notation on the chattel mortgage index.
Section 12. Search of Records-Fees. This section continues the
former act permitting a mortgagee to obtain information as to existing mortgages by having the County Clerk and Recorder make a
search for $2.00 for the first year and $0.50 for each year thereafter.
Section 13. Sale of Mortgaged Property. This section continue3
the provisions of the former act that a person who sells mortgaged
property to a third person without informing him of the fact of
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the mortgage shall forfeit and pay to the purchaser twice the value
of the property sold together with costs and attorneys fees.
Section 14. Larceny of Mortgaged Property. This section provides that if a mortgagor during existence of the mortgage sells,
transfers or encumbers mortgaged property he shall be guilty
of larceny and makes it a criminal offense unless at the time of
the making of such sale or transfer or encumbrance the mortgagor
fully advises the person to whom such sale or mortgage was made
of the fact of the prior encumbrances and also fully advises the
mortgagee of the intended sale giving such mortgagee the name
and place of residence of the party to whom the sale, transfer, or
encumbrance was made. This substantially continues in effect the
former act.
Section 15. Concealment Or Removal of Mortgaged Property.
This section continues the previous section of the act which makes
it a criminal offense (larceny) for a mortgagor or person, with
actual knowledge of a chattel mortgage during the existence thereof, to conceal or remove mortgaged property from the State of
Colorado without the consent of the mortgagee.
Section 16. What Transfers Have Effect of Chattel Mortgages.
This section continues the provisions of the former act which provides that regardless of the form of the instrument used if the
instrument was intended to be a chattel mortgage or lien upon
personal property, it will be construed as a chattel mortgage and
will be subject to the provisions of the act.
Section 17. Aircraft Mortgage. This is a new section. Heretofore, the method of taking chattel mortgages on aircraft was in
doubt. It was not clear whether compliance should be made with
the laws of the United States or the laws of Colorado or both in
order to have an effective mortgage on aircraft. Throughout the
country there has been a diversity of opinion as to proper requirements and where filing or recording should be made. In order to
set at rest such controversy the present act provides that the filing
or recording of aircraft mortgages in accordance with the laws of
the United States are sufficient in itself without necessity of compliance with the provisions of the Colorado chattel mortgage act.
Section 18. Application of Act. This section provides that the
Colorado Inventory Mortgage Act and Certificate of Title Act are
not affected by the new Chattel Mortgage Act.
Section 19. Repeal. The old Chattel Mortgage Act is repealed
by the new act. 10 It is to be noted that this section specifically provides that the provisions of the new act relating to filing or recording of instruments to continue the validity and enforceability
of a mortgage are applicable to existing mortgages. This fact is
important in that after July 1, 1961 extensions and annual statements under the old act will be discontinued and the new law
followed. Records should be set up for filing the Mortgage Status
Statements when required. 1
10 Colo. Reo. Stat. § 20-1-1to 20-1-20 (1953).
11 To illustrate, assuming that a mortgage was doted July 2, 1959, to mature July 2, 1964. Under
the old law, assuming the mortgage was filed on July 2, 1959, it would be necessary to file the
annual statement within a period of ninety days from July 2, 1961. Since the new law will be in
effect July 1,1961, the Mortgage Status Statement must be filed within a period of three years and
six months from the date of the mortgage, namely, six months from July 2, 1962. Thereafter, annually,
statements will be required to be filed in the manner and the times hereinbefore stated.
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Section 20. Securability Clause. This is merely a standard clause
with relation to constitutionality.
APPENDIX
A SAMPLE MORTGAGE STATUS STATEMENT
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Senate Bill 168 approved
April 24, 1961, the undersigned does hereby make, execute and file
the following Mortgage Status Statement:
(1) Name and address of Mortgagor (s):
Name(s)
(City)

(Street Address)

(State)

(2) Name and address of Mortgagee (s)
Name(s)
(Street Address)

(City)

(State)

(3) Date of filing or recording of mortgage: ----------------------------------------(4) Filing Number if mortgage filed, or book and page if mortgage
recorded:
Page ....
F ilin g N o . ......... ............ B ook .....
(5) Balance due on Mortgage $ ........................
D AT E D . .. ....... ...........

........................... . 19 6 --------

I M ortgagee* - A ssignee*
.........................................
*
**

Delete "Assignee" if inapplicable
Indicate authorized signature such as officer of corporation,
agent or attorney.
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COLORADO'S MAXIMUM RECOVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH v. THE CONSTITUTION
By M.

NEAL SINGER*

This note was awarded the 1961 Omar E. Garwood Memorial
Prize bf $100 in a competition sponsored by the Association of Colorado Claimants' Attorneys.
Thirteen states today' are depriving their citizens of a basic
constitutional right. They have restricted recovery in death actions,
even where losses greatly exceed limitation figures. Some courts,
when presented with the problem, have attempted to evade the
issue by placing responsibility upon the legislature.2 This note attempts to analyze the situation and point out the inevitable solution-the duty of protecting property rights rests with the judiciary.
I. BACKGROUND: STATUTORY HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION
The old common law rule that no cause of action exists for a
wrongful death dates back to 1607. 3 It was crystallized by Lord4
Ellenborough in his instruction to the jury in Baker v. Bolton.
Most authorities on the subject conclude that no satisfactory reasons for the rule have ever been advanced. 5
England, in 1846, attempted to provide a remedy for this obvious common law defect through the enactment commonly referred
to as Lord Campbell's Act.6 It is important to note that the act contains no limitation of damages, but leaves the amount of recovery
in the hands of the jury:
...and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom
and for whose benefit such action shall be brought .... 7
Colorado, in 1872, passed a statute patterned after Lord Campbell's Act wherein a deceased's personal representative could maintain an action for the benefit of specified beneficiaries (spouse, then
*Student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 See note 17 ,infro.
2 See note 28 infra.
3 Huggins v. Butcher, 1 Brownl. & Golds. 205, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (1607).
4 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
5 See Holdsworth, Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L. Q. Rev. 431 (1916); Prosser, Torts
105 at 710 (2d ed. 1955), states: ". . . result [of the common law rule] was that it was more
profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him, and that the most grievous
of all injuries left the bereaved family of the victim, who frequently were destitute, without a
remedy."
6 Stat. 9, 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846):
"It is Enacted,
I. That whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default,
and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case
the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been
caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
I1. That every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of
the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the
executor or administrator of the person deceased; and in every such action the jury may give such
damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought; and the amount so recovered,
after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the beforementioned parties in such shares as the jury by their verdict shall find and direct."
7 Stat. 9, 10 Vict. ch. 93, § 11 (1846).
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children, then father or mother).8 This original statute did not
limit the amount of recovery. However, the legislature amended
the statute in 1877 and inserted a limitation of $5,000 maximum
recovery. 9 Colorado has construed the act to be compensatory and
has held that recovery is "limited to the pecuniary loss resulting
from the death, to the party who may be entitled to sue."'" It [the
act] is always described as compensatory, and never as a solace
for wounded feelings."'" Compensatory damages have been defined
as "the estimated accumulations of the deceased during the probable remainder of his life, if he had not come to an accidental death,
having 1reference
to his age, occupation, habits, bodily health and
2
ability.
Mollie Gibson Consol. Mining & Milling Co. v. Sharp" determined that the act of 1877 was not unconstitutional merely because
it was a general title, broad enough to include all appropriate matters (constitutionality of the $5,000 maximum, however, was not

discussed)

.14

Colorado's recovery limitation was raised from $5,000 to $10,000
in 1951.15 This
figure was increased in 1957 to $25,000, our present
16
maximum.
II.

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS-OTHER STATES

Although statutory provisions for death recovery are found in
every jurisdiction, only thirteen states have retained maximum
limitations. 1 7 Constitutions in at least eight states specifically provide that there shall be no statutory maximum limitation upon recovery in death actions.'
In general, the measure of damages is based on earning capacity (at least this is one element to be considered by the jury).19
Language similar to the following indicates today's prevailing view:
8 Colo. H. Jour. 9th Sess. (1872).
9 Colo. Sess. Laws 1877 ch. XXV, § 879 (3).
10 Denver & Rio Grande Ry. v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9, 14, 52 Pac. 211, 213 (1898).
11 Mollie Gibson Consol. Mining & Milling Co. v. Sharp, 5 Colo. App. 321, 327, 38 Pac. 850,
B52 (1894).
12 Hayes v. Willis, 17 Colo. 465, 474, 30 Pac. 352, 355 (1892).
13 Supra note 11.
14 See Colo. Const. art. V, § 21, requiring that any bill contain only one subject, which must
be clearly expressed in its title.
15 Colo. Rev. Star.
41-1-3 (1953).
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-1-3 (1957).
17 State
Statute
Maximum Limitation
Colorado
§ 41-1-3
$25,000
Illinois
§ 70-1-2
$30,000
Kansas
§ § 60-3203, 3204
$25,000
Maine
ch. 165, § 9, 10; ch. 188
$20,000 (plus listed expenses)
Massachusetts
ch. 238
$2,000 - $20,000, depending on culpability.
Minnesota
§ 573.02
$25,000
Missouri
t 537.090
$25,000
New Hampshire
ch. 556, § § 11-13; ch. 91
$10,000 ($25,000 with widow, widower, minor
child or children, or dependent father or
mother)
Oregon
§ § 30.020, 121.020
$20,000
South Dakota
37.22
$20,000
Virginia
§ 635, 636. 638
$30,000
West Virginia
ch. 55, art. 7, § 6
$20,000
Wisconsin
§ 331-03-04
$22,500 (with additions for more children)
18 State: Arizona, art. 1, k 31; Arkansas, art. V,
32; Kentucky, § 54; New York, art. 1, § 16;
Ohio, art. I, § 19 (a); Oklahoma, art. 23, § 7; Pennsylvania, art. 3, § 21; Utah, art. XVI, 1 5.'
19 See Klepal v. Pa. R.R., 129 F. Supp. 668, oft'd, 229 F. 2d 610 (1956); Boise Payette Lumber Co.
v. Larsen, 214 F.2d 373 (1954); Holliday v. Pac. Ati. S.S. Co., 117 F. Supp. 729, aff'd, 212 F.2d 2C6
(1954); Frabutt v. N.Y. Central & St. Louis Ry., 84 F. Supp. 460 (1949); Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo.
465, 30 Pac. 352 (1892); McKirdy v. Coscia, 142 Conn. 80, III A. 2d 555 (1955); Seaboard Air Line
R.R. v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1952); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Young's Adm'x, 253 S.W.2d 585
(Ky. 1952); Hall v. Stiles, 57 N.M. 281, 258 P.2d 386 (1953).
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"the amount of damages [in death actions I is primarily for the jury
to determine, and . . .its verdict will not be disturbed except where
abuse of its discretion clearly appears. 2 - It is obvious that only by
discarding any semblance of logic can the mechanical approach of
a recovery maximum apply.

III.

COLORADO AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The constitution of Colorado provides:
In order to assert our rights, acknowledge our duties,
and proclaim the principles upon which our government is
20 Checkettes v. Bowman, 70 Idoho 463, 220 P.2d 682, 684 (1950).

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST,

1961

founded, we declare: . . . [That] all persons have certain

natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may
be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives
and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property; 2and of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness. '
• . . [That] courts of justice shall be open to every person,

and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person,
property, or character; and that right and justice should be
administered without sale, denial or delay. 22

.

..

[That] no

of life, liberty or property, withperson shall be deprived
23
out due process of law.

These rights are derived from the natural law and given constitutional sanction!
It appears that the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted
the right of recovery for wrongful death to be a property right:
. . . in contemplation of the Death Act plaintiff has sus-

tained a property damage attendant upon the death of her
husband. If, since the death was caused by injuries inflicted through negligence, a tort action terminology must be
employed in describing the nature of plaintiff's action, it
can be classified as a property tort action and cannot be
classified as a tort action "for injuries done to the person .... "24
In Rosane v. Senger,25 a malpractice suit which held that the statute
of limitations began to run only upon patient's discovery of the
gauze negligently left inside the wound, the court stated that "A
legal right to damage for an injury is property and one cannot be
deprived of his property without due process. There can be no due
process unless the party deprived has his day in court....
"A vested right of action is property in the same sense in which
and is equally protected against arbitangible things are 2property,
7
trary interference."
Before determining whether this property right is protected by
the constitution of Colorado (and the federal constitution), it must
first be decided whether it really is a right. Since the old common
law concept is that there is no right of action for wrongful death,
the argument arises that legislative action gives birth to a "privilege," and not to a "right." In fact, one Illinois decision upholds the
constitutionality of the Illinois Death Act on this basis. 28 The court
there indicated that when further legislative action appeared likely,
such likelihood has always mitigated against judicial change. However, as shown above, all fifty states provide a remedy for wrongful
death by statute and thirty-seven states have no statutory maximum (some by express constitutional provision, others without express authority in their constitutions 29). On this basis, one finds it
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Colo. Const. art. II, 3 (Emphasis added.)
6.
Colo. Const. art. II,
Colo. Const. art. II, § 25.
Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 163, 208 P.2d 930, 933 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
Id. at 370, 149 P.2d at 375.
2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 756 (8th ed. 1927); and cases cited in the footnote.
Hall v. Gillins, 13 111.2d
26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
Supra notes 17, 18.
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difficult to validly argue that a "right" has not arisen. Use of the
word "privilege" is obviously erroneous when describing an action
to sue for wrongful death. Consequently, one must be lead to conclude that the common law has been extended into this areathough it was accomplished by means of decisions dealing with the
statutes.
Since an action for wrongful death is a matter of substancea property right-it should be protected by the above provisions
of the Colorado Constitution. 30 Justice Franz, dissenting in a recent
Colorado decision 3' upholding the constitutionality of the guest
statute, stated:
Provisions of a Bill of Rights are primarily limitations
on government, declaring rights that exist without any
governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect . . .32
As those authorities show, any governmental action in violation of these declared rights is void so that provisions of
the Bill of Rights are self executing to this extent. ... .3
The bill of rights does not exist in a vacuum; but this effect
substantially occurs when a right is created and recovery (the
remedy) upon this right is so limited that only a partial remedy
arises. Is the total injury redressed by only a partial or limited
relief?
The Constitution of the United States provides:
The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all pri34
vileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal pro35
tection of the laws.
It appears that the Constitution secures in each state to citizens of
all other states "the right by the usual modes to acquire
and hold
36
property, and to protect and defend the same in law.

The right to bring an action for wrongful death, being a prop'37
erty right, must also fall within the protection of "due process.
The state is depriving a plaintiff of this right by limiting recovery
just as effectively as if it were to completely remove the remedy.
Where one has sustained a loss, he should be compensated for the
full amount of his damage. To limit recovery is to say: "Whether
your loss is determined to be $25,000 or $250,000, you may only recover $25,000." For practical purposes, therefore, only the poor can
afford to be killed in Colorado!
In Stoltz v. Burlington Transp. Co.,33 plaintiff brought an action

in Colorado to recover for the death of his son, caused by defend30 Supro notes 21, 22, 23.
31 Taylor v. Welle, 352 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1960).
32 See I Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 93, 358 (8th ed. 1927); I Am. Jur Constitutional Low
§ 308 (1937); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 199 (1956).
33 Supra note 30 at 110, the court cites Quinn -. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957).
34 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 (1).
35 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
36 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 821 (8th ed. 1927). (Emphasis added.)
37 Supra note 34.
38 178 F.2d 574 (10th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 929 (1949).
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ant's negligent act occurring in Utah. The court held that amount
of recovery is governed by the lex loci and not by the lex fori.
Therefore, Utah's statutes and constitution determined the amount
of recovery upon plaintiff's property "right." This decision leads
to a frightening analogy. If a man earning $200,000 per annum
were to be negligently killed on the Colorado-Wyoming border
(Colorado -$25,000 limitation; Wyoming-no limitation), then a
matter of inches would determine whether his personal representative were to receive $500,000 or $25,000. At the same time, both
states maintain that the damages awarded shall be fair compensation for resulting "pecuniary" injuries.3 9
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is one that seeks
an equality of treatment of all persons, even though they enjoy the
protection of due process. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate, but merely requires that all persons subject to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions, both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. 4 Following this reasoning, one might logically
conclude that equal protection is not denied by limited recovery. It
can be shown that the act applies equally to all citizens of the
state. This point, however, serves as mere dictum when its advocate attempts to by-pass the safeguards guaranteed by due process.
Here, the state is not varying the procedural aspects, which are
permitted under the equal protection clause, 4t but there are substantive rights involved. Numerous decisions prevail wherein
plaintiff's property rights were protected, thus allowing him full
recovery 42for his damage and providing due process under the constitution.

IV. DECISIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS UPHOLDING DEATH ACTS

In Carroll v. Missouri Pac. Ry.

43

the Missouri court awarded

damages of $5,000, the maximum amount permitted by statute. Defendant's special defense that the damage act was unconstitutional
because the amount of recovery was fixed at $5,000, was not allowed. The court held the act constitutional, basing this conclusion
on (1) the fact that a decision of unconstitutionality "would invalidate a very large number of other sections in our statutes,"44
and (2) the fact that other similar sections and provisions of the
39 St.

Lukes Hasp.

Ass'n.

v.

Long,

125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952);

Denver &

Rio Grande

Ry.

v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9, 52 Poc. 211 (1898); Colo. Coal & Iron Co. v. Lamb, 6 Colo. App. 255, 40 Poc.
251 (1895); Mollie Gibson Consol. Mining & Milling Co. v. Sharp, 5 Colo. App. 321, 38 Pac. 850 (1894);
Pierce v. Connors, 20 Colo. 178, 37 Pac. 721 (1894); Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298,
3 P.2d 105 (1931).
40 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 824 (8th ed. 1927).
41 Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
42 0'Toole v. U.S., 342 F.2d 308 (1957) where an award of $400,000 damages for wrongful
death of a 54 year old man with annual earnings of $250,000, and a life expectancy of at least
10 years, was not excessive; New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Zermani, 200 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1952),
judgment for $141,500 aff'd; McKee v. Jamestown Baking Co., 198 F.2d 551 (3rd Cir. 1952), verdict
for $69,769.55 held not excessive; Frazier v. Ewell Eng'r & Contracting Co., 62 So.2d 51 (Fla.1952),
judgment on verdict of $66,000 entered; Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew, 220 Miss. 609, 71 So.2d 752 (1954),
an action to recover damages for death of 14 year-old girl caused by gasoline explosion, where it
was held that an award of $90,000 damages was not excessive; Curtis v. Atchison, 363 Mo. 779,
253 S.W.2d 789 (1952), verdict of $60,000, on appeal, reduced by remittitur to $40,000; Hicklin v.
Jeff Hunt Mach. Co., 226 S.C. 484, 85 S.E.2d 739 (1955), verdict and judgment for $30,000 aff'd;
Mock v. Ati. Coast Line Ry., 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E.2d 833 (1955), verdict awarding $50,COO actual plus
$15,000 punit:ve damages not excessive.
43 88 Mo. 239, 57 Am. Rep. 382 (1885).
44 Id. at 246.
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law had been "heretofore
declared constitutional," citing Missouri
45
Pac. Ry. v. Hume.

Upon careful examination of the Carroll case, it is evident that
no constitutional question was actually decided. The first reason
set forth, (1) above, bears no semblance to the constitutional policy
of protecting and preserving individual property rights. Authorities cited to support the remainder of the decision, (2) above, were
not in point. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Hume upheld a Missouri statute
which imposed double damages on any railroad corporation not
complying with requirements of erecting and maintaining cattle
guards and fences on the sides of its roads, stating there were no
violations of due process or equal protection. This was a penal
statute and had no provisions for limiting recovery rights-factors
creating a weak precedent for the decision.
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act, limiting recovery to $25,000,46
has been held constitutional. 47 Rationale for this decision rested
upon three foundations: (1) The legislature created both the right
and the remedy, and its power to limit the maximum recovery in
the action that it created can not be questioned; (2) The common
law has characteristically imposed close limitations upon the parties entitled to sue. If the deceased had survived, his injuries might
have been such as to inflict upon these plaintiffs deprivations of the
same kind and of equal severity. Yet the only person entitled to
recover would be the injured man himself; (3) The differences between the action sought to be maintained and the action that is
available under the statute are not sufficiently significant to warrant recognition of a new remedy, because this point of great concern has been the subject of frequent legislative attention; 4 the
likelihood of further legislative action has always militated against
judicial change.
In (1) above, it is conceded that the legislature originally
created the right and the remedy. However, Colorado has interpreted the right as being one of property, 49 consequently, the right
45 115 U.S. 512 (1885).
46 III. Rev. Stat., ch.70 (1) (2) (1957).
47 Hall v. G:llins, 13 111.2d26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
48 Amount of recovery in Illinois was increased to $10,000
$20,000 in 1951, to $25,000 in 1955, and to $30,000 in 1957.

in

49 Fish v. Liley, supro note 24; Rosanne v. Senger, supra note 25.
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is protected by the constitution. In (2) above, the Illinois court
apparently overlooks the fact that an action for wrongful death is
50
Therefore, the
a "new cause of action"-not a "survival" statute.
court's analogy is misleading.
Finally, in (3) above, the court refuses to act because "further
legislative action appears likely." Surely, this is no reason to deprive a person of his constitutional rights. If our legislature is subject to a strong insurance lobby, then the courts must protect the
rights of the individual from the profit-motivated forces of these
organizations. If the only solution is for the courts to create a new
cause of action, then so be it! Rights guaranteed by the constitution must be protected from legislative abuse.
'
As was stated in Muller v. Oregon,-" " [I] t is the peculiar value
of a written constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence and sta' '52
bility to popular government which otherwise would be lacking.
CONCLUSION

It is not a valid argument that the majority of death actions
involve amounts under $25,000 (or $35,000, or whatever a future
limitation might be). State action in this area must be derived from
its sovereign or police power. Surely, the enactment of the wrongful death limitation cannot be said to be reasonably calculated to
protect the health, safety, welfare or morals of the people of Colorado. Traditionally the amount of recovery for property loss is determined by a jury. Little justification can be found for a legislature's substitution of a mechanical barrier when the property right
happens to be the support and comfort of a loved one. Mr. Justice
Cardozo has observed:'
Death statutes have their roots in dissastifaction with
the archaisms of the law ... It would be a misfortune if a
exnarrow or grudging process of construction were to
53
emplify and perpetuate the very evils to be remedied.
Modern reasons for existence of a maximum recovery limit are
(1) the difficulty of measuring damages arising by reason of the
wrongful death of a person, and (2) the possibility of extreme
awards being made by juries due to the strong feelings of sym54
The obvious answer to this reasonpathy aroused by such cases.
ing is that constitutional safeguards should not be removed merely
because the problem becomes more difficult or because emotionally
toned verdicts become possible. These should never be grounds for
refusal of adequate relief in a modern court system.
Through legislative enactment, a child today has a right enforceable in a court of law against one who has deprived him of
support and maintenance of his father, as well as damages for loss
of other rights arising out of the family relationship destroyed or
defeated by a wrong-doing third party. Further legislation to limit
the amount of recovery upon this right now vested, materially and
unconstitutionally impairs its intended substance.
50
51
52
53
54

Fish v. Liley, supro note 24.
208 U.S. 412 (1907).
Id. at 420.
Von Beech v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350 (1937).
16 Am. Jur. Death § 184 (1938).
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BOOK REVIEWS
GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW. By Michael Birks. 1 London: Stevens
& Sons Limited, 1960. Pp. 304. $4.75.
Have you ever wondered about the distinctions between barristers and solicitors? "Gentlemen of The Law" clearly pictures the
barristers and solicitors in an interesting and historical setting. Although there are comparative references to the barrister, the main
emphasis is upon the solicitor. The fifteen illustrations plus the
quotations preceding each chapter lend a Dickensish quality to the
piquantly amusing and informative text.
Starting in 1200 A.D., the attorney, as the man of law was first
named, was the friend whom the litigant took to court with him.
Not long afterwards a small group of attorneys began specializing
in the very technical field of pleading and gradually migrated to
the Bar in London where they became the predecessors of today's
barristers. In time they lost contact with the populace outside their
narrow confines and now are retained only through a solicitor. In
the nineteenth century the term "attorney-at-law" was abolished
by act of Parliament in favor of the name "solicitor." He continues
to function as both legal and business advisor to his clients.
The education of the solicitor from the earliest time has been
an apprentice system whereby the young man was articled to the
practicing solicitor. Whether the young man paid for his apprenticeship depended upon the supply and demand of both solicitors
and office help. His education was equally as haphazard with more
emphasis being placed upon the numbers allowed to become articled than upon the thoroughness of his knowledge.
The formation of the Law Society in 1831 regularized the profession and exerted an influence upon legal education, ethics,
and reforms. It was instrumental in arranging the first law examinations prior to admitting attorneys to the rolls. Compared to
today's very strict control over the admission of solicitors, this first
examination in 1836 was five hours long, allowed the applicant to
choose which of the questions he wished to answer, and the one
hundred and one candidates passed it to a man.
The development of the colonial attorney is illustrated by examples in Australia and America. The first Australian attorneys
were convicts who were deported from England, and law for some
time was a pawn supporting their corrupt schemes. In America the
first lawyers were the educated immigrants from England. Attorneys were a necessary part of colonial life and were assimilated
into that life; but barristers, whose qualifications depended upon
membership in the English Bar, were considered as a foreign import and disappeared soon after the Revolutionary War.
To the lawyer of today who bemoans the general reputation accorded him, it will be small comfort to realize that this public image
of his profession as a collection of unethical opportunists has followed him throughout his history. Some of the inept and inequit1 Principal Clerk to the Registrar of the Chancery Division of the High Court since 1953.
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able practices of his precedessors are shown by Birks and perhaps
even a somewhat biased attorney is enabled to obtain a fresh insight into the mirror by which he is seen. Inroads into this vision
of the shady practicioner have been made from time to time, and
this book chronicles some of these reforms by the government, the
lawyers as individuals, and the Law Society.
"Gentlemen of The Law" is replete with examples of the solicitor as seen through diaries, records, and letters of the men of the
various periods. This reviewer feels that author Birks might have
had a better pace had he let some of these characters remain in
their anonymity. The book leans heavily upon the historical anecdotes and, while some are very amusing, others are only tedious.
On the whole, "Gentlemen of The Law" is very readable and gives
historical perspective to some of the curious practices in the legal
profession that belong to the English past as well as to our own.
Joyce Cocovinist
THE WORLD OF LAW. Ediled by Ephraim London.' New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1960. Pp. volume I 654, volume II 780. $17.50.
Nothing is more frightening than the prospect of reading and
reviewing a two volume work. Visions of tired eyes, limp mind
and other assorted anatomical irritations flit through the semiconscious thoughts of the poor soul who, in a moment of weakness,
t Student, University of Denver College of Law.
1 Member of the New York Bar Association.
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said to a smiling book review editor, "Yes, I'll do the review for
you." Such was my unhappy frame of mind when, quite reluctantly,
I opened volume one to page one in the set called The World of
Law. But soon I found myself caught up in the pages with such
delightful intensity that since that fateful evening, I have ignored
my work, neglected my wife and lost most of my friends - but
I've read the books. The writings to be found in The World of Law
were written by the masters and have been assembled with the
utmost care and taste.
There are dozens of books purporting to be collections of writings designed "especially for your lawyer friends." These range
from dreary compendiums of flat humor to overwhelming (and
usually unread) tomes compiling the writings of the "great" legal
philosophers. Most of these books leave the reader with a distinct
feeling that the editor threw together the first twenty-five writings
he could collect that seemed to fit into his theme without any real
regard for their worth or appropriateness. These are usually preceded by a long flowery introduction meaning nothing. It can
honestly be said that Mr. London's The World of Law does not fall
into that category.
In the modestly short (two pages) introduction, Mr. London
describes the criterion he used for the selection of the materials
in the books in this fashion:
There is no Plimsoll line, to borrow a metaphor from the
law, for the judgment of literature. Great literature should
ignite or inspire; but whether it does or not depends in
part on the reader. I believe each work included here met
that test when I read it, though in some instances the flame
gave more light than heat. No other test or system was
used in the selection of the material, except that I avoided
technical writings that would not be understood by a reasonably intelligent person untrained in the law.
To list all the selections found in these volumes would far
exceed the limitations placed on a short book review. Even to take
a few under the heading of a representative sampling is to detract
from the book. Yet, such is considered de rigueur and I dare not
violate an honored tradition, so here are a few of the multitude of
titles in Volume One of The World of Law: From The Apocrypha
- "Susanna and the Elders;" from Don Quixote - "The Cases
Judged by Sancho Panza;" from The Pickwick Papers- "The Trial
of Bardell v. Pickwick;" Terence Rattigan's The Winslow Boy (in
play form); Agatha Christie's The Witness for the Prosecution
(much better ending than the movie version); Arthur C. Train's
"The Dog Andrew;" Anatole France's "Monsieur Thomas;" and
from Rabelais' Gargantua and Pantagruel,"On Judge Bridlegoose
and Lord John the Loony."
Volume one of this set is designated as "The Law in Literature" and contains only writings produced by those outside the
legal profession as they gaze in our windows. These lookers'in
seem to have a delightful ability to look into lawyers and the law
with such sharpness of vision that there is generated in the lawyer
reader an uneasy feeling that his world is not so remote and mysterious as he might prefer.

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST,

1961

Volume Two is designated as "The Law as Literature." In this
part, Mr. London has included writings by lawyers and judges
engaged in an intramural pinching and patting of the Goddess
Justice. It must be said that Mr. London has not remained exactly
true to his chosen title for the second
2 volume, for here one finds
much also from the pens of lookers-in.
Volume Two contains such titles as: Gandhi's plea for the
severest penalty upon his conviction for sedition; Mr. Justice
Holme's dissenting opinion in United States v. Schwimmer; Damon
Runyon's historic account of the troubles of "Daddy" and "Peaches;"
H. L. Mencken's blistering reports from the Scopes Trial; "On the
Science of the Law" from Gulliver's Travels; and Judge Jerome
Frank's provocative Courts on Trial is called upon for "On Lawsuits as Inquiries Into the Truth."
If you are a lawyer, or if you want to give a really fine present
to someone who is, or wants to be a lawyer, then this is the best
set of books you can find for many pleasant hours of reading enjoyment. The World of Law is a world of reading delight. To
Simon and Schuster, the publishers, and to Ephraim London, the
editor, my cap is doffed!
Karl P. Warden*
2 I am mindful, however, that, by local custom, a lawyer should approve a title if at all possible.
Thus, the cloud referred to is not sufficient to render these books unmarketable.
Assistant professor, University of Denver College of Law.
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BAR BRIEFS
WORLD COURT- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
DISPUTES'
By JOHN A. MOORE*
In a decision last year 2 the International Court of Justice resolved a boundary dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua that
had continued without settlement since the 19th century. In 1894
these countries signed the Gamez-Bonilla Treaty providing for a
Mixed Boundary Commission to settle various points at issue on the
boundary between them. Matters which the Commission could not
settle were to be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed of one
representative from each country and a third representative chosen
by procedures set out in the Treaty. The Treaty further provided
that the arbitral decision would be considered "a perfect, binding
and perpetual treaty between the High Contracting Parties, and
shall not be subject to appeal."
The Commission settled part of the boundary but disagreed on
a lengthy portion involving a sizable territory. An arbitral tribunal
was formed and, as was frequently the case in international disputes during this era, the third arbitrator was to be the head of a
friendly state. The King of Spain was asked to act as arbitrator;
he accepted this task and handed down a decision generally favorable to Honduras. After initially appearing to accept this decision,
Nicaragua later claimed that the decision was invalid. Numerous
settlement attempts over the years failed. Finally, Honduras and
Nicaragua agreed to submit the matter to the World Court, both
states recognizing that the Court had compulsory jurisdiction in
view of each state's acceptance of jurisdiction under the "optional"
clause of the Court's statute, article 36, paragraph 2.
Neither party had a national of its own country on the Court
at the time this case was heard and consequently, in accordance
with the statute of the Court, each was able to appoint a so-called
"National Judge" to sit with the regular Judges. Honduras appointed Professor Robert Ago of Rome and Nicaragua appointed Professor Francisco Urrutia Holguin, Ambassador of Columbia; thirteen
of the fifteen regular Judges of the Court participated. The decision was in favor of Honduras 14 to 1, the Courtholding that Nic*Member, Colorado Bar Association Committee on World Peace Through Low; Mr. Moore is a member
of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations and the Denver firm of Holland & Hart.
1 Mr. Justice Sutton is Chairman of the Colorado Bar Association Committee on World Peace
through law. A function of this committee is to bring to the attention of the bar and laity of Colorado
present instances of effective world and international law with a view to fostering understanding
of the rule of low among nations.
This comment on an important decision of the International Court of Justice is published as a
means of bringing the work and methods of the court to the attention of the Colorado Bar.
2 Arbitral Award Made by The King of Spain on December 23, 1906 (Honduras vs. Nicaragua),
Judgment of November 18, 1960. International Court of Justice Reports 1960, page 192.
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aragua is under an international obligation to give effect to the
Spanish monarch's award.3
The majority rejected the contentions of Nicaragua that the
King of Spain was not designated an arbitrator in conformity with
the provisions of the Gamez-Bonilla Treaty, and that the Treaty had
lapsed before the King agreed to act as arbitrator. It was pointed
out that no question was at any time raised in the arbitral proceedings before the King with regard either to the validity of his
designation or to his jurisdiction. As to effective date of the Treaty,
the Court examined the language and actions of the parties in determining their intention as to when the Treaty first came into effect and decided that Nicaragua had not regarded the Treaty as
lapsed during the appointment proceedings. Without citation of
specific authority, the reliance of the Court upon principles of acquiescence by and estoppel against Nicaragua seems clear.
Nicaragua further tried to establish the nullity of the award
of the King of Spain on the grounds that it was vitiated by: (a)
Excess of jurisdiction; (b) Essential error; (c) Lack or inadequacy
of reasons in support of its conclusions. Nicaragua further contended that the award was incapable of execution by reason of its omissions, contradictions and obscurities.
All of these contentions were rejected by the Court, which held
that the award was sufficiently clear to be executed, that no "essential error" had been proved, and that repeated acts of recognition of the award by Nicaragua barred it from further challenge.
Throughout the opinion reliance is placed upon the failure of
Nicaragua to raise its arguments in due time, although the Court
holds that in any event the award would be binding. Furthermore,
there is reluctance to examine in detail the procedure employed by
the King of Spain. The approach is rather like that of an appeals
court refusing to reverse a trier of facts where the decision appears
regular on its face and is based upon no obvious inaccuracies or
irregularities.
The opinion shows an instance of judicial decision in a type of
question which has frequently led to armed conflict and deep resentment between nations. It further demonstrates the respect for
and adherence to principles of international law and jurisdiction
which have frequently marked the course of Latin American history. It is encouraging to see two nations recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court over
a case which arose many years
4
before the Court's establishment.
3 The Nicaraguan National Judge dissented in favor of Nicaragua, Judge Moreno Quintana
(Argentina) attached a declaration to the majority opinion suggesting that a different procedure would
have been more appropriate in reaching the decision. Judge Sir Percy Spender (Australia) attached
a separate concurring opinion. The dissent of Judge Urrutia Holguia was lona and detailed and involved a number of points of law peculiar to the Latin American countries. The majority opinion is
Free from detailed reliance on legal doctrine and it is interesting to note that of the four Latin American
Judges sitting in the case, only Judge Noreno Quintana took up any one of the points of the dissent
and even he failed to agree in the result with Judae Urrutria Holguin. As is frequently the case in
the World Court, there seems to hove been little difference in point of view between Judges from
civil law and common low countries on the Court, which included Judges trained in Islamic, Chinese
and Russian legal systems.
4 An interesting footnote to the case is that Professor Philip C. Jessup participated as co-counsel
for the losing party, Nicaragua. Professor Jessup has recently been elected a Judge of the Court to
replace Judge Sackworth in a position traditionally held by a Judge from the United States.
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SERVING PRODUCERS IN THE
INTERSTATE SALE OF NATURAL GAS
By

ROBERT

T.

JAMES*

An attempt is made to demonstrate in this paper the proposition that almost all of the problems and legal requirements of a
small or medium sized oil and gas producer relating to the federal
regulation of the sales of natural gas in interstate commerce can
be effectively handled by the local attorney. The only reason for
the qualification "small or medium sized" producer is that the
larger producer will have its own legal staff. This service to the
producer will require only a small additional overhead expense
and the fee realized will be equal to, or greater than, that realized
in handling the producer's other affairs. The private practitioner
who examines title to the drill site, draws the drilling contract,
draws or inspects the operating agreement and division orders can
and should counsel his client and handle most of his client's affairs
relating to the interstate sale of his gas and the resulting control
by the Federal Power Commission.
If you have a producer client, you will discover sooner or later
that consideration must be given to the control that the Federal
Power Commission exercises over gas sales. In talking with attorneys who serve such clients, I have found that the local attorney
will often conclude that this regulatory control is outside the area
in which he can give effective service and advice, and the client,
together with the fee, is referred away. Such action is a disservice
to both the attorney and the client. The attorney loses the fee and
the client loses the services of the person who best knows the
details of his business.
The Federal Power Commission was established as an independent agency in 1930 and is vested with the regulatory functions
of the federal government relating to electric power and natural
gas. The jurisdiction of the Commission over natural gas is derived
from the Natural Gas Act' which was enacted in 1938. As it pertains to interstate gas sales, the act purports to control the price
of gas from birth to death. Therefore, the producer problems relating to the regulation by the Commission of sales of natural gas,
together with the services required of the attorney, resolve themselves into four general areas: (1) obtaining the initial authorization to make the sale, (2) securing increases in the sale price of
gas in accordance with the gas sale contract, (3) terminating
deliveries, and (4) general investigations by the Commission into
the over-all gas sale prices of the client.
I.

CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY

Specifically, along with the transportation of gas in interstate
commerce, section 1 (b) of the act 2 extends federal jurisdiction over
the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate
public consumption, and to natural gas companies engaged in such
sales. Commission control thus extends over practically all sales
Member of the El Paso and Colorado Bar Associations, and practicing attorney in Colorado Springs.

1 15 U.S.C. § 717-717(w) (1938).
2 Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 822 (1938),

15 U.S.C.

§ 717(b) (1958).
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of natural gas to pipeline companies, except where the gas does not
go beyond a state boundary. For many years after the enactment
of the act, it was generally thought, or at least hoped, that the
words of section 1 (b) " . . . but shall not apply .

.

. to the produc-

tion or gathering of natural gas" excluded independent producers
from Commission control. However, Phillips Petrol. Corp. v. Wisconsin,3 decided June 7, 1954, set the matter to rest. The Commission thereafter prescribed "Regulations under the Natural Gas
Act" applicable to independent producers, separate from those
applying to the pipeline companies. These regulations appear as
sections 154.91 to 154.103 and 157.23 to 157.31 of title 18 in the Code
of Federal Regulations, and prescribe the manner of making certificate applications, changes in rate schedules, abandonments, etc.
The "Rules of Practice and Procedure" before the Commission
appear as sections 1.1 to 1.37 of said title 18 and govern such matters as pleadings, service, size of paper, and conduct of hearings.
Once a client has contracted to make a sale of his gas, subject
to Commission jurisdiction, by command of section 7 of the act 4
he must make application to the Commission for a "Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity" for such sale before commencing actual delivery. The contents of such application and the
necessary exhibits thereto are spelled out in sections 157.24 and
157.25 of the regulations. For a typical wellhead sale, items (i) to
(v) of Section 157.24 might be answered as follows:
(i) The gas so sold has been produced from applicant's wells
on its leases in the Big Beaver field, in Washington
County, Colorado, shown on the general map attached
hereto as "Exhibit A." The point of delivery of such
gas by applicant to the purchaser is at the wellhead.
(ii) Applicant's sale has not been, and is not proposed to be,
accomplished by means of any pipeline or other facility
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
(iii) No community is proposed to be served directly by such
sale.
(iv) No industrial customer is proposed to be served directly
by such sale.
(v) Except for the usual and ordinary oil and gas lease
equipment, applicant has no major appurtenant properties or facilities which have been, or are proposed to
be, utilized in making this sale.
The above is not offered as a model of draftsmanship but only
to demonstrate a common approach. The "Exhibit A map" prescribed by section 157.25, as a minimum requirement, need only be
a printed form of township map which may be obtained from any
legal stationery store. The lease area that is described in the contract may be indicated by shading, together with an accurate legal
description of the lease area. "Exhibit B" would be a conformed
copy of the contract. The application should be verified. It should
be noted that if the producer's total annual jurisdictional gas sales
are in the aggregate less than 1,000,000 Mcf, section 157.23 (b) of
3347 U.S. 672 (1954).
4 Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 824 (1938),

15 U.S.C.

§ 717 (f) (1958).
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the regulations provides that only the information called for in
"Exhibit A" need be filed.
In the case of the usual casinghead gas contract, that is, where
the sale of gas is made to the operator of a processing plant for a
percentage of the proceeds from the resale of the residue gas, the
sale is a jurisdictional sale, 5 but the plant operator must make the
required certificate applications and other required filings.6 Also,
where the operator of a producing unit is a party signatory to the
sale contract, the operator must make the required filings. 7 As a
co-owner signatory party to the contract, one may make his own
filings in addition to that required of the operator, and it is the
author's strong feeling that it should be done. The decision not
to make one's own filings where allowed could prove to be a most
costly mistake in dealings with the Commission. This will not
become evident until the time has come to make application for
price increases. This matter is more fully discussed in part II of
this paper. Generally, where the operator is required to make the
necessary filings, the co-owner who is non-signatory to the gas sale
contract cannot make his own filing.8 In the event the non-signatory
co-owner does enter into a separate sale contract with the same
purchaser and after the signatory co-owner has obtained a certificate and made deliveries, the filing of the contract with the Commission is a "rate change" subject to section 4 and not an "initial
filing" under section 7.
If there is a lease expiration date approaching or for any other
reason one must initiate immediate deliveries pending formal action
by the Commission on his application, he can, by letter accompanying the filing of the application or afterwards, give notice of intention to invoke the temporary authorization of section 157.28 and
commence immediate deliveries after having received a notice from
the Secretary of the Commission of acceptance of the filing. This
procedure should be reserved for real emergencies, because once
deliveries have commenced in interstate commerce, Commission
approval is necessary to discontinue. Frequently the temporary
certificate issued under this section will be "conditioned" to provide
that the contract price be lowered, or to provide that the difference
between the contract price and the permanently certificated price
be refunded, or other variations. Since Sunray Oil Co. v. F.P.C.,1°
these conditions have been fairly specific.
Once the application has been filed, it will be assigned a docket
number and eventually an order will issue setting the matter for
hearing.
If the sale is not one of a number of similar sales to a common
purchaser involving an expansion of its facilities; if the sale is at
or lower than the area price established by the Commission 11 in
5 Deep South Oil Co. v. F.P.C., 247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957); Shell Oil Co. v. F.P.C., 247 F.2d 900
(5th Cir. 1957); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. F.P.C., 247 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1957); Continental Oil Co.
v. F.P.C., 247 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1957).
6 18 C.F.R. § 154.91(e) (1949).
7 18 C.F.R. § 154.91(b) (1949),
8 18 C.F.R. § 154.91(d) (1949). See also Sun Oil Co. v. F.P.C., 256 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1958).
9 Sun Oil Co. v. F.P.C., 281 F.2d 275 (1960).
14)270 F.2d 404 (1959).
11 The latest pronouncement by the Commission establishing area prices, as of the date of this
article, is General Policy Statement No. 61-1, September 28, 1960.
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the producing area involved; and if there are no protests or petitions to intervene filed in the docket, the matter will be set for
hearing along with a number of unrelated cases and a certificate
will be perfunctorily issued. The order in such a case will set a
date and time for hearing, and state that it will not be necessary
for the attorney or client to be present. The ultimate order will
recite that at such hearing staff counsel orally moved that the intermediate decision procedure be omitted and that the Commission
directly give a final decision 12 issuing the certificate.
If the sale is protested or parties are allowed to intervene in
the docket, the certificate application will be set down for formal
hearing. If the sale is a part of a program of expansion by the
pipeline purchaser, all the applications for sales along with the
pipeline company's application to construct additional facilities
will be consolidated into one proceeding for hearing. 3 It is not
within the scope of this paper to detail the problems involved in
a contested certificate hearing. Suffice to comment in passing that
the hearing is in some respects similar to a court trial proceeding
in that it falls upon the applicant to maintain the burden of proving that " . . . the applicant is able and willing to do the acts and
perform the service proposed . . . and that the proposed . . . sale
... is or will be required by the present or future convenience and
necessity .... -14 Customarily, the pipeline purchaser will assume
the initiative in such a consolidated proceeding and call a meeting
before the hearing at which the forms of proof, necessary witnesses,
and procedure will be discussed. Quite often, prepared or "canned"
testimony is used and is formally adopted by the witnesses at the
hearing.
Two uncertainties regarding the authority of the Commission
concerning certificates were resolved recently in Sun Oil Co. v.
F.P.C.15 and Sunray Oil Co. v. F.P.C.16 The Sunray case held that
the Commission need not give a certificate for the term of the contract but can (and usually does as a matter of policy) give certificates for an unlimited duration. Similarly, the Sun case concluded that not only does the Commission certify a "sale," but also
a "service," and that when an old contract expires and the parties
enter into a new contract, the new contract is a "rate change"
within the meaning of section 4 of the act, and not a contract
necessitating a new certificate under section 7.
There are several common problems that arise after the issuance of a certificate. Frequently, as a result of successful developmental drilling and extensions of fields, additional sales are made
to the same purchaser from acreage adjoining that described in
the original sale contract. Although no such procedure is contained in the Commission's rules or regulations, a time honored
method of getting Commission approval for such sale is by means
of a petition filed with the Commission to amend the original certificate. No prescribed form exists, but it is suggested that the
petition should advise the Commission of the details of the prior
12 18 C.F.R. 1.30c(l) (1960).
13 18 C.F.R. 1.20(b) (1960).
14 15 U.S.C. § 717 f(e) (1958).
15 364 U.S. 170 (1960).
16 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
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certificate proceedings and generally contain the information required of an original application for a certificate. In such circumstances the Commission will usually issue an order amending the
original certificate and authorizing the additional sales.
Immediately after the Phillips decision 1'7 on June 7, 1954, pursuant to the resulting Commission order, the independent producers
were required to file all existing gas sale contracts involving jurisdictional sales with the Commission as rate schedules. This was
done in great haste and in some instances contracts were filed
which later were discovered to have involved no jurisdictional
sales. A simple method to clear the record in such a situation is
to file with the Commission a petition to cancel the certificate,
accompanied by a statement from the purchaser confirming the
non-jurisdictional aspects of the sale. If there is no disagreement
as to the lack of jurisdiction, an order will issue cancelling the
certificate.
If the client sells his interests in producing properties from
which sales have been previously certificated, petition can be made
to the Commission to amend the certificate to exclude the transferred prope:ties, or, in the event the client has disposed of all his
interest, petition to cancel the certificate can be made. It is recommended that in any such sale, the parties stipulate that the purchaser will make immediate application for a "Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity" to continue the deliveries and sale of the
gas from the transferred properties.
II.

CHANGES IN SALE PRICE

Traditionally, most long term gas sale contracts provide for
future increases in the price of the gas. These increases take the
form of definite periodic escalations, or some form of indefinite
price redetermination clauses. Although these clauses are a part
of the original contract when the certificate is issued, obviously
an increase in price based on such clauses is a "change" in rates
as defined in section 4 (d) of the act.' 8 Therefore, a change in rates
should be filed with the Commission if a price increase is desired.
Section 154.94 of the regulations details the manner of making
the filings for such increases. One must file his change in rates at
least 30 days in advance of the date it is to become effective in
order to comply both with section 4(d) of the act and section
154.94 (b) of the regulations.
In filing for proposed increases, sub-sections (e) and (f) of
section 154.94 require special attention. The "basis for the proposed
change" as set out in sub-section (d) is, of course, a contract provision, and it is recommended that reference be made to the applicable contract clause and that it be set out verbatim. In addition
to the required information asked for in items (i) through (v)
of sub-section (e), all other "reasons," as stated in said sub-section
(e), that justify the increase, and "a full statement in support of
such increase," such changes-in-rate filings contain statements
relating to the needs of the applicant for increased revenue and
further recite that the original contract was arrived at by arm's
17 Phillips Petrol. Corp. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
18 Episcopal Theo. Sem. v. F.P.C., 269 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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length bargaining; that the increased price constitutes an integral
part of the consideration upon which said contract is based; and
that the proposed increased price does not constitute a new "price
plateau" nor is it "out-of-line" with current prices being paid in
the area.19 Frequently other price increases at comparable levels
are detailed, if the information is available, setting forth the names
of the purchasers and sellers, rate schedules and supplement numbers, dates of price increases, areas, etc. If cost information relating
to the properties described in the sales contract is available showing exploration, acquisition and operating costs, and showing that
the expected profit from the sale is not large, it is recommended
that this also be included.
The necessity for such cost information is a controversy that
has not been completely resolved. In the past, Eastern Seaboard
distributing companies have intervened in producer proceedings
where the proposed increase has been suspended pursuant to section 4 (e) of the act, and have made the claim that if cost evidence
is not submitted by the producer in his proposed changes in prices,
he has not made a "full statement in support of such increase" as
required by sub-section (f) of section 154.94 of the regulations and
therefore the Commission should reject such proposed changes.
The basis of their reasoning apparently comes from the 1955 pipeline case of Detroit v. F.P.C.-'t1 In view of the very recent decision
of the Commission in the Phillips Petrol. case,-" it would appear
that cost evidence is not necessary for a "full statement." However,
the progress of this decision should be followed through the courts
as an aid to conduct in this regard.
The Commission can (and frequently will) suspend price increases for a period of five months from the effective date thereof,
that is, the date proposed to make the increase effective. As the
end of the suspension period approaches, in order to put the increased price into effect, one must file a motion as stated in section
4 (e) of the act, and section 154.102 of the regulations. Upon receipt
of the motion, the Commission will issue an order stating that the
increased rate will go into effect as of a certain date, subject to
the producer's refunding to the purchaser such portion of the
increase found not to be justified by the Commission. The order
19 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
20 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
21 Phillips Petrol. Co., G-1148, Opinion and Order No. 338, September 28, 1960.
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will also require, before collection of the increased rate can begin,
that the producer file an agreement and undertaking (or bond)
to refund such portions of the increased prices, with interest, found
by the Commission not to be justified. The practice has grown in
the last few years of filing the agreement and undertaking at the
same time the motion is filed. The Commission has formally recognized the practice.2 2 The Commission will now, in one order,
accept the agreement and undertaking if satisfactory, and allow
the increase to become effective, subject to refund. If the client
is a corporation, a certificate of the secretary of the corporation
should be filed which sets forth the resolution by the board of
directors giving the officer signing the agreement and undertaking
the necessary authority to do so, together with the secretary's
statement that such resolution has not been rescinded, annulled
or revoked.
At this uncertain stage of development in proceedings before
the Commission, unless the client has very large increases in net
dollars, section 4 (e) suspensions should be avoided, if at all possible. Once suspended, the increased price that can be collected will
probably be refunded at some future time, with interest at 7% per
annum. Aside from the additional bookkeeping burden involved in
accounting for these funds for your client's own purposes, the Commission requires frequent reports concerning the amounts collected.
When one is so unfortunate as to have several rate increases
under suspension, they will usually be consolidated for hearing.
It is quite difficult to get to trial on one or a few price suspen-

sions.2 4 At any such trial, as provided in section 4(e) of the act,

" ... the burden of proof to show that the increased rate or charge
is just and reasonable shall be upon the natural-gas company."
It is not within the scope of this paper to cover the problems of a
trial involving section 4 (e) price increase suspensions. As an aid
to judgment in trying to avoid them at the present time, the observation should be made that no definite standards as to what
constitutes a prima facie case to sustain the burden of proof have
been formulated.2 5 Before the Commission's decision in the Phillips
case issued September 28, 1960, a minimum case was usually a traditional public utility
"cost-of-service" study of the total client's
jurisdictional sales26 plus any other evidence deemed worthy of
consideration. "Field price" and "commodity" evidence was frequently introduced along with the above mentioned cost evidence.
It is still too early to formulate any definite plan in view of Phillips.
It would appear that cost evidence pertaining to the industry as a
whole is relevant, particularly as such costs relate to the areas
in which a particular suspension is located.27 A conservative
approach would also indicate that a cost-of-service study, calculated on the same basis as that used by the Commission for Phillips
22 Natural Gas Act,
1 252 Stat. 323 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 c(e) (1958).
23 18 C.F.R. § 154. 0 (e) (1949).
24 At the end of 1959 there were 3065 producer rate increase suspensions pending before the Commission, which is an increase of 1031 suspensions over 1958.
25 See May, Preparaton For Gas Rate Hearing before the Federal Power Cornmiss'on, Eleventh
Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Low and Taxation, 123. "
26 See Episcopal Theo. Sem. v. F.P.C., 269 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Bel 01 Corp. v. F PC., 255
F. 2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958); Detroit v. F.P.C., 240 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Mississippi Riv. Fuel Corp. v.
F,P.C., 121 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1941).
27 Phill:ps Petrol. Co., Supra note 21 at 11.
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Petroleum Company in Phillips,would be of value where suspended
prices exceed the Commission's established area prices. The preparation of any such case would invariably involve the use of expert
testimony, would take a long time to prepare, and would entail
tremendous expense.
To successfully avoid a section 4 (e) suspension of a price increase allowed by a client's gas sale contract involves some hardship but is usually worthwhile. One way to avoid the hardships
of section 4(e) of the act is not to file for the price increase provided in the contract. This course is founded upon the simple
premise that it is not good business to spend a large sum of money
to try to obtain a lesser amount in the form of a price increase.
Particularly, this is true when the chances of succeeding are so
small. Surprisingly enough, several large producers follow this
course. I suspect that the possible avoidance of a section 5 general
investigation is involved in this practice also. This is discussed
further in part IV herein. A more obvious approach is to determine what the Commission-approved price is for the particular
area involved and then file for so much of the contract price increase as will be allowed without question.
If one should incur one or more section 4(e) price increase
suspensions, he still has several alternatives other than a formal
trial. First he can petition the Commission to terminate the suspension proceedings showing, if it happens, that the Commission
has allowed similar price increases in his area without refund
obligations.2 Also, if his price increase is above that which he believes will be allowed by the Commission, he can file an "Offer of
Settlement" pursuant to section 1.18 (e) of the Commission's Rules
of Practice and Procedure, in which an offer can be made to reduce
the proposed price to the level that he believes the Commission
will accept.
From the above discussion, one can see the advantages of making his own filings, as pointed out in part I, instead of entrusting
this duty to an operator, as judgment and interest in these matters
may very well differ.
It has been the Commission's policy to reject price increase
filings made during the suspension
period of a prior filing.2 9 This
policy is currently being litigated. 30
III.

TERMINATION AND ABANDONMENT

Once natural gas enters into interstate commerce, deliveries
cannot be terminated "without the permission and approval of the
Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding
by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is
depleted to the extend' that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment."'

1

The problem of termination

arises quite frequently: wells are depleted; the seller wishes to
28 Reef Fields Gasoline Corp., 19 F.P.C. 351 (1958).
29 See Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 8 F.P.C. 1224 (1949); Federal Power Commission, Statement
of Federal Policy and Interpretations Under the Natural Gas Act § 2.52 (1958).
30 Amerada Petrol. Corp. v. F.P.C., Cause No. 6483 (July 25, 1960).
31 Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 324 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(f)(b) (1958).
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use some or all of the gas for secondary recovery operations; or
a contract terminates.
The philosophy once existed among many producers that the
Commission only certificated a "sale" and that upon the completion
of the term of a contract or upon the depletion of a well, the Commission's jurisdiction ended. The Sun and Sunray cases 32 adversely
settled this issue, but the philosophy persists with many in the case
of depleted wells. Desirable as it may be from a producer's viewpoint, it seems well settled as a matter of law that Commission
approval is a prerequisite to termination or abandonment of deliveries of gas flowing in interstate commerce. 33 Commission regulations 154.97 and 157.30 detail the procedure to be followed to obtain
approval to terminate deliveries.
In the case of a property that has become depleted, seeking
Commission approval to terminate deliveries may seem to be a
rather useless thing. However, it is recommended that it be done.
Not only will there be technical compliance with the law, and avoidance of the possibility of penalties, but in the event of new discoveries on the property involved at a later date, there would seem to
be no question but that the new sales from new discoveries are
"initial" sales to be certificated pursuant to section 7 of the act, and
not changes in existing rates subject to suspension pursuant to section 4 (e) of the act. This is important, of course, because the Commission will, at the present time, certify a price higher than that
which they will allow as a rate increase. If there is no protest, the
Commission will usually accept a verified application to terminate
as sufficient proof of the depletion, and in due time grant approval
to terminate.
To obtain Commission approval to terminate deliveries to make
a new sale or to use the gas in secondary recovery operations, requires an extremely strong case. Termination has been allowed
where the seller has shown that the buyer does not need the gas
involved, 34 and where termination would end flaring and promote
good conservation practices, 35 but it has been refused in cases where
a higher price appeared to be the primary object, 36 and where the
Commission believed that the37public need for gas production outweighed conservation benefits.
IV.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS

Under the authority of section 5 of the Natural Gas Act, 38 the
Commission can institute a general investigation into the rates,
charges and practices of a natural gas company, which includes, of
course, an independent producer. The initial investigation of a producer was that of Phillips Petroleum Company. Later, in January
32 Supra notes 14 and 15.
33 In addition to the Sun case cited in note 14, see J. M. Huber Corp. v. F.P.C.,
(3rd Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 971 (1957).
•34 Rutherford, 23 F.P.C. 357 (1960).
35 Atlantic Refining Co., 16 F.P.C. 1010 (1956).
36 Dixie Pipe Line Co., 14 F.P.C. 106 (1955).
37 Harper Oil Co., 22 F.P.C. 756 (1959).
38 52 Stat.823 (1938),15 U.S.C. § 717d (1958).
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of 1956, the Commission issued the "Tennessee" orders.3 9 These
orders instituted section 5 general investigations into the activities
of the Chicago Corporation, Gulf Plains Corporation, Alfred C. Glassell, Jr., Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., Continental Oil Co., The Altex
Corporation, The Atlantic Refining Co., Tidewater Oil Co., Ralph E.
Fair, Ralph E. Fair, Inc., Gillring Oil Co., Humble Oil and Refining
Co., C. V. Lyman, The Nueces Co., and Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. At
last count, only six of these investigations had been terminated; this
gives some indication of the manner in which these proceedings
race along. Many investigations of this nature have since been. instituted. Other than in the "Tennessee" cases, the reason usually given
by the Commission in the order instituting such investigation is that
there is outstanding, with respect to the sales of the company or
individual involved, a large number of suspension orders concerning
rate increases. This raises the question of the legality of all the
rates of the company or individual. To the extent that this is the
motivating factor, it certainly lends substance to the suggestion
made in Part III that the section 4 (e) suspensions should be avoided
if at all possible.
It is difficult to detect a common denominator in the events
causing these investigations. The companies and individuals being
investigated cover the range from large to small in total volumes
of gas sold and from high to low in average prices being received
for such sales.
The Commission has lately adopted the tactic of consolidating a
section 5 general investigation with a group of section 4(e) rate
suspensions for trial. Although the burden of proof is upon the
Commission in a section 5 general investigation, the burden is upon
the producer in a section 4(e) proceeding. By thus consolidating
the proceedings, the producer must prepare and go forward first
with his evidence to sustain his increased prices suspended pursuant
to section 4(e) of the act, thus accumulating the bulk of the data
required by the Commission"s staff in preparing its direct section
5(a) case. As is the case in section 4(e) suspension proceedings,
the requirements of a prima facie case in a section 5 general investigation are not settled and the defense of such an investigation is
costly and time consuming. There is, of course, some advantage for
39 Instituted upon the complaints of the Tennessee Public Service Commission and others.
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the producer in postponing the ultimate decision in a section 5
general investigation, because an order from such a proceeding,
lowering the contract prices, is prospective. It is in the area of
general investigations that seeking the assistance of an attorney
experienced in such matters is recommended when one has had
little contact with such cases.
Some encouragement in the area of section 5 investigations has
been handed the independent producer in the recent Phillips decision. 40 There the Commission dismissed the section 5 general investigation pending against Phillips, debunked an individual company
cost approach, and indicated that "fair prices for gas" would require
development on an area basis "based on reasonable financial requirements of the industry." It is probable that definite standards
will soon be established as to the requirements of a prima facie case;
but until the Phillips decision has run the gauntlet of the appellate
courts, the conservative approach would again seem to suggest a
traditional cost-of-service study following that used by the Com41
mission for Phillips Petroleum Company.
40 Phillips Petrol. Co., G-1148, Opinion and Order No. 338, September 28, 196W.
41 The quantity of resecrch oicts c.nd rcference works one may wish to acquire w'll, of course,
depend upon the volume of work that will be done in this area. Copies of the Natural Gas Act, the
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure end the Commission's regulations under the Natural Gas
Act with approved forms can be purchcsei from the United States Government Printing Office in
pamphlet form for about 40g each. The Natural Gas Act is contained in annotated form in title 15 of
the United States Code Annotated and the commission's Rules and Regulat:ons cre printed in title 18
of the Code of Federal Regulations. The Natural Gas Act and the Rules and Regulations, clang with
related Commission and court decisions, are contained in a Commerce Clearing House loose leaf service
entitled "Utilities Low Reporter, Federal." The Government Printing Office publishes and sells most,
but not all, of the Commission's decisions and orders in bound volumes ent;tled "Federal Power Commission Reports."
In addition, the Federal Power Commission distributes without charge its press releases, and
copies of all its opinions, decisions and major orders. The Commission also sells a 25¢imcp show:ng
and identifying the major natural gas pipelines-a very worthwhile source of information. Many
important commission and court decisions and related matters are collected in the Oil and Gas
Reporter published by the Southwestern Legal Foundation. The Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law
and Taxation, held by the Southwestern Legal Foundation, usually publishes papers relating to Federal
Power Commission activities, as does the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute. A fairly recent
"Administrative Law Treatise" by Kenneth Culp Davis in four volumes deals with the Federal Power
Commission along with other agencies and has a section containing practice forms. The Publ'c Ut.lities
Reports, Inc., publications include: "Conduct of the Utlity Rate Case," by Frances X. Welch, "Ruling
Principles of Utility Regulations" by Ellsworth Nichols, and "Preparing for the Utility Rate Case" by
Frances X. Welch. Foster Associates, Inc., of Washington, D.C., published a weekly bulletin concerning
:urrent activities before the Commission, including summaries of evidence presented in the proceedings
and summaries of the imoortant briefs filed with the Commission. And, of course, low reviews are a
prolific source of current information in the field.
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OPINION NO. 17
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
ADOPTED JANUARY 20, 1961
SYLLABUS

It is improper for a lawyer to prepare legal documents in connection with the sale of real property at the request of a firm, which
specializes in assisting persons in the sale of their own property,
and which does not act as a true broker in the transaction.
FACTS

A firm offers services in connection with the sale of real property. The services comprise, among other things, the maintaining
of files and other information on available property in the area, a
file of prospective buyers and sellers of property, and the closing of
real estate transactions including the preparation of deeds, notes,
deeds of trust, and allied documents. A seller wishing to avail himself of the services of the firm signs a contract under the terms of
which he agrees that if he sells his property within the time prescribed (usually 90 days) he will pay the firm a flat fee of $300.00.
The firm then places a for sale sign on the property, inserts advertisements in the newspapers, and in other respects aids the person
in the sale of his property. The contract provides that the seller
furnish a title insurance policy (no mention is made of an abstract
of title). When the seller finds a buyer for the property, the firm
or its attorney prepares the option contract and, at the appropriate
time, closes the sale. No separate charge is made for the preparation of the legal documents, but the seller is informed that if he
retains his own lawyer the $300.00 fee will be reduced by $25.00.
Otherwise, an attorney employed or retained by the firm will prepare all the legal documents.
OPINION

The preparation of legal documents in connection with the sale
of property constitutes the practice of law. This is true even though
standard printed forms are used and the only service performed is
filling in the blank spaces on the forms. But the Supreme Court of
Colorado decided in the so-called "real estate cases" (135 Colorado
398) in 1957 that even though constituting the practice of law these
documents could be prepared without charge by licensed real estate
brokers with respect to transactions handled by them. The first
question to be disposed of is whether the attorney in question is in
violation of Canon 47 which provides that no lawyer shall permit
his professional services to be used in the aid of the unauthorized
practice of law.
We hold that the firm in question is not within the ambit of the
real estate cases. We are convinced that the opinion of the court,
as it relates to sales of real estate, is intended to apply only to the
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usual seller-broker or buyer-broker relationship. In such instances
the broker can prepare the legal documents necessary to close the
sale by completing standard and approved printed forms. The facts
of the above case disclose an entirely different relationship. The
firm is not acting as a broker, though it may be licensed as such,
but rather is offering certain services for sale, including services
which are the practice of law. We cannot believe that the protective umbrella of the court was intended to extend so far. Thus the
activities of the firm, in our opinion, constitute the unauthorized
practice of law.
It follows that the attorney in question, by aiding or making
possible this unauthorized practice, is in violation of Canon 47.
By his conduct the attorney also violates Canon 35, which states
in part:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A
lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual.
He should avoid all relations which direct the performance
of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A
lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the
responsibility should be direct to the client.
Who is the client? Even though the attorney is employed or
retained by the firm, the legal documents he prepares affect the
rights and liabilities of the buyer and seller of the property, not
the firm. Therefore, the intervention of the firm between the attorney and the parties to the sale is improper.
Furthermore, the attorney also violates Canon 6, since he is in
effect representing both buyer and seller. This canon provides that
it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
Lastly, Canon 27 prohibiting advertising is violated, since the
described activity is a feeder supplying the lawyer with legal business from persons who would not otherwise seek him out.

OPINION NO. 18
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
ADOPTED JANUARY 20, 1961
SYLLABUS

It is improper for an attorney who is also a city councilman
(a) to appear on behalf of a defendant who is charged with violation of a city ordinance in the municipal court of that city; and (b)
to represent a client before administrative departments or agencies
of that city. It is also improper for a member or associate of the
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law firm of which the city councilman is a member to act as an attorney in either of the above situations.
FACTS

An attorney in the private practice of law is also a member of
the city council. The city council does not appoint municipal judges
or administrative department or agency heads, but does appoint the
members of the board of adjustment which hears zoning and building appeals. The limits of the salaries of municipal judges are established by city charter but the council has authority to fix the
salary within such limits. The council approves the budget of the
municipal court and appropriates funds for the operation of that
court as well as all city departments and agencies.
OPINION

In Opinion No. 14 this Committee concluded that in a situation
where the city council hired the municipal judge and fixed his
salary it was improper for an attorney-councilman to practice in the
municipal court on behalf of defendants charged with violations of
city ordinances. The practice there condemned is equally improper
where the council, although not directly appointing the judge, must
approve the court's budget and appropriate funds for its operation.
The same conclusion must be reached with respect to the representation of a client by an attorney-councilman before an administrative department or agency of the city. Even though the conduct of both the department and the attorney is scrupulously correct, it is likely that an individual client, or the public, will believe
that an attorney-councilman would receive a more favorable reception from a municipal department or agency than would a noncouncilman. An attorney who is also a public officer has an obligation to avoid any appearance of possible impropriety resulting from
his dual position.
The pertinent rule regarding the appearance before municipal
courts, departments or agencies of other members of the firm of
which the attorney-councilman is a member has been stated as
follows:
"The relations of partners in a law firm are such that
neither the firm, nor any member or associate thereof, may
accept any professional employment which any member of
the firm cannot properly accept." Opinions 49 and 72 of the
Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association. To the same effect are Opinions 33 and 103 of the
same committee.
The foregoing rule is frequently harsh in its application, particularly where, as here, an entire firm is precluded from a substantial area of private practice because one firm member, often at
a financial sacrifice, serves part time in a public or political position. The rule, and the policy considerations upon which it is based,
are nevertheless too firmly established to permit of modification at
this time.
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OPINION NO. 19
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
ADOPTED MARCH 17, 1961
SYLLABUS

A lawyer who habitually and deliberately performs legal services for less than the customary charges of the Bar for similar services or less than the fees recommended in the minimum fee schedule adopted by his local Bar Association is engaged in the improper
solicitation of business which is unethical.
FACTS

A lawyer engaged in the practice of law has over a period of
time habitually and deliberately performed legal services for less
than the customary charges of the Bar for similar services or less
than the fees set forth in the minimum fee schedule adopted by his
local Bar Association.
OPINION

Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics advises that in
fixing fees lawyers should avoid charges that overestimate their
advice and services, as well as those which undervalue them. Canon
12 states, in part:
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite
properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the acceptance
of employment in the particular case will preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases likely to arise out of
the transaction, and in which there is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be employed, or will involve
the loss of other employment while employed in the particular case or antagonisms with other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar for similar services; (4) the
amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (5) the contingency or
the certainty of the compensation; and (6) the character of
the employment, whether casual or for an established and
constant client. No one of these considerations in itself is
controlling. They are mere guides in ascertaining the real
value of the service. In determining the customary charges
of the Bar for similar services, it is proper for a lawyer to
consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a Bar Association, but no lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby or to follow it as his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee. In fixing fees it should never be
forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting trade.
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We note that a fee schedule is not to be viewed by lawyers as
controlling or as an absolute criterion in fixing the amount of their
fees. However, "Efforts, direct or indirect, in any way to encroach
upon the business of other lawyers are unworthy of t hose who
should be brethren at the bar." Opinion No. 8, Committee on Professional Ethics of the State Bar of Wisconsin (1957). It should be
obvious that any lawyer who, in setting his fees, deliberately and
habitually undercuts the customary charges of the bar for similar
services is soliciting employment. This fact is bound to become
known to the public. Such solicitation of employment, directly or
indirectly, is proscribed by Canon 27 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics. See also Opinion No. 7, Committee on Professional Ethics
of the Idaho State Bar (March, 1958). This would be true regardless of the existence of a minimum fee schedule.
Canon 12, as construed in Opinions 28, 56 and 171 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association,
seeks to preserve the personal relationship between lawyer and
client, leaving the fixing of the fee to the independent judgment of
the lawyer in each case. Canon 12 lists a number of considerations
to assist the lawyer in determing a reasonable charge. One of these
considerations is a schedule of minimum fees adopted by his Bar
Association.
As stated by the President of the Illinois Bar Association, "It
is a far cry from the honest effort of a conscientious lawyer to determine what would be a reasonable fee for him to charge, to the
practice of habitually under-cutting the fees charged by the other
members of the bar, and letting it be known that whatever his
brothers charge, he will take on the work for less." The Board of
Governors of the Illinois State Bar Association held, in Professional
Ethics Opinion No. 194, that this conduct amounted to advertising
and solicitation in a not-too-subtle form and, therefore, was violative of Canon 27.
Finally, we note that Resolution XXVIII of Hoffman's Fifty
Resolutions (1836) states "As a general rule I will carefully avoid
what is called the 'taking of half fees'. And though no one can be
so competent as myself to judge what may be a just compensation
for my services, yet when the quiddam honorarium has been established by usage or law, I shall regard as eminently dishonorable all
underbidding of my professional brethren. On such a subject, however, no inflexible rule can be given to myself, except to be invariably guided by a lively recollection that I belong to an honorable
profession." The Fifty Resolutions of David Hoffman of the Baltimore bar, along with Sharswood's Professional Ethics, formed the
foundation for our modern Canons of Ethics. Our thesis is that the
practice of law today is the same honorable profession as that of
which David Hoffman spoke.
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OPINION NO. 20
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
ADOPTED JUNE 23, 1961
SYLLABUS

Although controversies with and lawsuits against clients concerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer, a lawyer
may ethically seek recovery of a fee for services rendered to which
the client has agreed and which the client has promised but failed
to pay, either by a lawsuit against the client in the lawyer's
own name or by assignment of the claim against the client to a collection agency.
FACTS

A lawyer performs non-litigation legal services for a client for
an agreed fee. After the services have been concluded to the apparent satisfaction of the client and the work product has been delivered to the client, the lawyer renders a statement in the agreed
amount which the client fails to pay. The lawyer's discussions with
the client about the bill do not disclose any dissatisfaction with the
services nor the amount of the fee and the lawyer knows of no reason why payment of the fee would cause the client undue financial
hardship, but repeated promises by the client to pay the bill are not
fulfilled. May the lawyer ethically: (1) assign the bill to a collection agency? or (2) sue the client in the lawyer's own name?
OPINION

Canon 14 of the CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS provides:
Controversies with clients concerning compensation are to
be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with
his self-respect and with his right to receive reasonable
recompense for his services; and lawsuits with clients
should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition
or fraud.
This admonition against controversies with or lawsuits against
clients is couched in forceful terms and should be considered a
strong substantive limitation on the actions which a lawyer may
take in efforts to collect a fee. Ours is a learned profession, not a
mere money-getting trade. (See Canon 12.) However, Canon 14
also gives clear recognition to the right of a lawyer to be reasonably compensated for his services and to the right to bring suit to
collect this compensation where necessary.
The facts presented indicate that no settlement fund or judgment belonging to the client is available upon which he might assert the lien granted by C.R.S. '53, 12-1-10. Further it appears that
he has already delivered to the client any papers against which he
could assert a lien pursuant to C.R.S. '53, 12-1-11. The fact that he
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has not availed himself of this statutorily prescribed method of enforcing payment for his services does not, however, cause him to
lose the right to avail himself of other legitimate means of obtaining a reasonable recompense for his services.
It should be noted that no controversy is presented as to the
amount of the fee; the only question relates to the methods of collection which may be used. The facts imply that the lawyer has
reasonably reached the conclusion that satisfaction of his claim
cannot be obtained without resorting to one of the two suggested
methods for obtaining such recovery, but it is the opinion of the
committee that the lawyer should honestly reach this conclusion
before embarking on either course. Only where circumstances imperatively require it should the lawyer resort to either of these
means to compel payment.

It is the opinion of the committee that in this case, if the lawyer has reasonably concluded that only by resort to one of the two
suggested methods of collection could he collect the fee, he may use
either method for that purpose. Neither assignment of his claim to
a collection agency nor suit in the lawyer's own name for the purpose of collecting the fee would be unethical.
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